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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the effects that intangible capital and diversity reputation have on 
firm performance. In Chapter 1, entitled “CEO Overconfidence and Intangible Corporate 
Investments,” we extend the corporate investment and CEO overconfidence literature by 
examining how CEO overconfidence affects investment-cashflow sensitivity using a new 
measure of Tobin’s q and cashflow. Specifically, we incorporate intangible capital, which neo-
classical investment theory mostly ignores, in the empirical analysis. We develop three 
overconfidence measures and their interaction with the respective standard and new cashflow 
settings to capture the investment-cashflow sensitivity effect of CEO overconfidence. We use 
three investment measures (physical, intangible, and total investments) and find that the effect of 
managerial overconfidence on investment-cashflow sensitivity is more prominent for corporate 
intangible investments than physical investments. Moreover, our results show that the standard 
measure of physical capital weakly explains the intangible investment-cashflow density. Our 
study offers useful insights in that it explains the reason why investment-cashflow sensitivity has 
been weaker in recent years. We also show that investment-cashflow sensitivity is stronger when 
intangible capital is incorporated into the analysis. Chapter 2 is entitled “Diversity Reputation 
and Firm Performance.” The modern American workplace is a microcosm of modern American 
society. The increasing diversity of the American workforce has made the increasing diversity of 
the American workplace a necessity. We explore the impact of diversity reputation on firm 
performance. We measure a firm’s diversity reputation by its inclusion in DiversityInc’s list of 
Top 50 Companies for Diversity. We measure firm performance by various accounting measures 
(return on assets, return on investment, and return on sales) as well as one market-based measure, 
Tobin’s Q. We find that firms that have a better diversity reputation outperform firms that do not.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Intangible Capital, Intangible Investment, Total Cashflow, Total Q, CEO 
Overconfidence, Diversity, Diversity Reputation, Firm Performance
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Chapter 1 
CEO Overconfidence and Intangible Corporate Investments 
 
1. Introduction 
The empirical studies of investment theory predominantly focus on physical capital, barely 
incorporating intangible capital into the analysis. Over the past 30 years, most advanced 
countries have shifted from the brick-and-mortar economic system to the technology and service-
oriented economy. One of the key reasons for not including intangible capital in empirical tests 
of investment theory is that it is difficult to reliably measure the price and future benefits of these 
capital assets. Fortunately, Peters and Taylor (2017) (hereafter, P-T) have developed a 
methodology that proxies intangible capital and brings it into neoclassical investment theory. An 
empirical test of their theory suggests that almost 44% of capital stock in U.S. Compustat firms 
consists of intangible capital. They find that neoclassical Tobin’s q (standard q) theory, 
developed to measure physical investment opportunities, is still effective in explaining total 
investments (intangible investments plus physical investments). However, a new proxy (total q) 
to measure intangible investments provides better investment regression results.  
 
To understand the industry and firm level determinants of investments, researchers in recent 
times have focused on the agency problem and the role CEOs play in investment and financing 
decisions at the personal level1. While these studies primarily use the neo-classical theory of 
investment, which emphasizes physical investments, to examine CEO characteristics and 
distortions in firm investment policies (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), we study the sensitivity of 
                                                          
1 Malmendier & Tate, (2005), Malmendier & Tate, (2005a), Friedman, (2007), Eichholtz & Yonder, (2015), Lin, et 
al., (2005), Huang, et al., (2016) 
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corporate investment to cashflow of optimistic CEOs, who tend to overestimate the future returns 
of their companies. We conduct our analysis using two different approaches—the literature’s 
standard Tobin’s q (Erickson & Whited, 2012), and P-T’s total q. We segregate the firm’s 
investment decisions into three categories—namely physical investments, intangible 
investments, and total investments, to test the impact of CEO personal characteristics on 
distortions of firms’ investment decisions.  
 
In their studies of agency theory, Jensen (1986) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) argue that 
misalignment of interests between managers and owners cause distortions in the firm’s 
investment decisions. On the other hand, Myers & Majluf (1984) blame such distortions on 
information asymmetry between managers and the capital market. Both information asymmetry 
and agency costs cause investments to be sensitive to a firm’s cashflow. While under the agency 
cost theory managers overinvest to maximize their own benefits and engage in empire building, 
under the information asymmetry theory managers restrict external financing to prevent dilution 
of shares of their company. In the latter approach, increased cashflow would increase 
investments by reducing distortions. Several corporate finance studies identify imperfections in 
the capital market as the key reason for investment-cashflow sensitivity, but the relation between 
investment and cashflow remains a controversial issue (Fazzari, et al., 2000) & (Kaplan & 
Zingales, 1997). Malmendier & Tate (2005) take a different route in explaining investment-
cashflow sensitivity. They look to the personal characteristics of the CEO, who is the top 
decision-making insider. They argue that overconfident CEOs will overestimate the returns of 
their investment decisions. Therefore, given sufficient internal funds in the absence of corporate 
governance, an overconfident CEO will overinvest. In the absence of sufficient internal funds, 
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overconfident CEOs are reluctant to raise funds through equity issues as they perceive that any 
new equity issue will cause the market to undervalue their company stocks.  
 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) extend Heaton’s (2002) study, which asserts that the key cause of 
investment distortions is managers overestimating their investment returns, by further developing 
and extending the model to investigate the relation between capital structure and CEO 
overconfidence. Both Malmendier & Tate (2005) and Heaton (2002) test physical investments 
and CEO overconfidence. In this study, we further extend their studies by incorporating the 
intangible capital measure of P-T into the literature’s standard investment measures.  We also 
use two different measures of firm value and cashflow. The standard measure, which consists of 
physical capital, uses Tobin’s q (standard q) and cashflow (standard cashflow). Our new, more 
comprehensive measure, which we will call [P-T], uses Tobin’s q (total q) and cashflow (total 
cashflow) and consists of both physical and intangible capital.  
 
The CEO overconfidence concept used in this study stems from the social psychology 
literature—the “better than average” effect (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). That is, individuals 
overestimate their ability and consider themselves to be above average (Alicke, 1985). Because 
of the “better than average” effect, individuals express unrealistic optimism about future events 
(Weinstein, 1980) and overestimate their chance of success even in the economic decision-
making process (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Evidence of this overestimation phenomenon, 
where a CEO overestimates the future performance of their corporation, exists in the behavioral 
corporate finance literature (Malmendier & Tate, 2005).  
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The literature on managerial overconfidence provides significant evidence that overconfident 
CEOs impact corporate investment decision-making of firms (Huang, et al., 2016). Roll (1986) 
first coined the term managerial “hubris” to explain the value-destroying activities managers 
undertake. The term “hubris” is analogous to managerial overconfidence in the sense that 
“hubris” makes the manager too optimistic about the success of their mergers and acquisitions. A 
similar finding from Malmendier & Tate (2008) states that overconfident CEOs accept value 
destroying M&A deals because they overestimate their firm’s ability to generate returns. Heaton 
(2002) shows that in the absence of information asymmetry, optimistic managers overestimate 
the performance of their corporate projects and invest in negative NPV projects even though they 
remain loyal to shareholders. Malmendier et al. (2011) find that overconfident CEOs prefer debt 
over equity because they believe that equity is more undervalued than debt. This belief of 
overconfident CEOs leads to higher than average leverage.  Campbell et al. (2011) show 
theoretically that the level of optimism in CEOs is linked to their corporate investment decision-
making. High (low) optimism in CEOs leads to over (under) investments.  
 
Our CEO overconfidence study enhances the overconfidence-based investment distortions 
literature in several ways. Our new measures of investment and cashflow explain overconfident 
CEO behavior better than the literature’s standard investment and cashflow sensitivity measures, 
which only consider tangible capital. Malmendier & Tate (2005) reveal an important result—
even if a CEO’s incentives are perfectly aligned and she operates in a non-information 
asymmetry environment, she may choose to investment sub-optimally. We show that such sub-
optimal investments are more likely to happen to intangible corporate investments. Thus, if 
achieving the optimal investment levels that maximize shareholders’ interests is the goal, it is 
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imperative to establish organizational policies through the formation of an active board of 
directors and impose restrictions on the use of free-cashflow for intangible investments.   
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
An overconfident CEO’s investment decision is motivated by the cash position of the firm 
(Malmendier et al., 2011). Investment increases when the firm has more internally generated 
cash. We test our investment and CEO overconfidence relationship with the prediction that 
positive investment (physical, intangible, and total investment) and cashflow (both standard and 
total cash-flow) arise from CEO overconfidence. We develop the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Total q (qtot) and total cashflow (ctot) explain the investment-cashflow sensitivity 
of overconfident CEOs better than standard q (q*) and standard cashflow (c*). 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of CEO overconfidence on intangible investment-cashflow sensitivity is 
higher than its effect on physical investment-cashflow sensitivity. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Total q (qtot) and total cashflow (ctot) explain the investment-cashflow sensitivity 
of overconfident CEOs better than standard q (q*) and standard cashflow(c*) when the firms 
operate under financial constraint. 
 
3. Empirical Approach 
3.1 Overconfidence Measures  
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Measuring the confidence level of a CEO is not straightforward. To construct the measures of 
CEO overconfidence, we follow a modified Malmendier & Tate (2005, 2008) methodology that 
holds that an overconfident CEO’s revealed preferences are reflected in her option exercising 
behavior. CEO total compensation includes a large number of stocks and options, which they can 
hardly diversify through trading or short-selling. It is rational to assume that given non-
diversification, a risk-averse CEO should exercise her options early whenever the options are 
sufficiently in the money. Hall & Murphy (2002) state that the exact option exercising behavior 
depends on numerous factors such as CEO age, health, wealth, risk-appetite, remaining option 
period duration, and scope of diversification. Taking these factors into consideration, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) find that a subset of CEOs fails to exercise in the money 
options early. This late-exercising behavior motivated Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) to 
develop their overconfidence measure. To minimize the effect of endogeneity in our 
overconfidence study, we use additional controls and show that our results are not caused by 
industry/firm effects or firm characteristics such as size and level of financial constraint. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) use Holder67 and Longholder as the two proxies to measure 
overconfidence. However, Malmendier et al. (2011) conclude that Longholder is the best 
measure to proxy CEO overconfidence. Based on this, we use longholder40 as our CEO 
overconfidence measure in this study. Longholder402 is a dummy variable which takes the value 
1 if the CEO ever held an option to the final year of its duration and the option is at least 40% in 
the money entering its final year, otherwise it takes the value 0. Following Campbell et al. 
(2011), we apply two additional overconfidence measures. Whereas longholder40 identifies 
overconfident CEOs, the 100% cutoff (longholder100) is our proxy for the CEOs who are even 
                                                          
2 Hall & Murphy (2002) and Huang et al. (2016) use the 40% threshold under the assumption of a Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (CRRA) coefficient of 3. It also assumes that 67% of the CEOs’ wealth are in their own company 
stocks. 
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more overconfident. Longholder100 requires that a CEO fails to exercise options given 100% 
moneyness of the options and repeats the behavior at least twice during the sample period.  
 
3.2. Calculation of the Moneyness of options 
We calculate option moneyness using Compustat - Capital IQ from Standard & Poor's 
Execucomp database. The database does not have the option grant specific exercise price. To 
overcome this, we follow the approximation methodology that the average stock price of the 
options is the realizable value per option, which is the estimated value of in the money 
unexercised exercisable options (Execucomp data item OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) divided 
by the number of unexercised exercisable options (Execucomp data item 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM) (Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016; Campbell et al., 2011).  
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑂𝑃𝑇_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋_𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑆𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿
𝑂𝑃𝑇_𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑋_𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑅_𝑁𝑈𝑀
 
 
We then compute the average exercise price of the option by subtracting the realizable value per 
option from the fiscal year-end stock price (CRSP data item: prcc_f) and obtain the estimated 
average exercise price of the options: 
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (𝑃𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 – Realizable value per option). 
 
Finally, to compute the average percentage of the moneyness of the options, we divide the 
realizable value per option by the estimated average price of the options:  
  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
 
We include the measure longholder_low as a compliment to longholder100. We define a 
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longholder_low CEO as one who exercises her stock options that are less than 30% in the money 
and who does not hold any other options that are more than 30% in the money (Campbell, et al., 
2011). Similar to the longholder100, a CEO must exhibit the relevant exercising behavior at least 
twice in the sample period. To compute the moneyness of exercised options of a longholder_low 
CEO, we divide the value realized on options exercised (OPT_EXER_VAL) by the number of 
shares acquired on the exercised options (OPT_EXER_NUM) to get the per option value 
realized from the exercise:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 =
𝑂𝑃𝑇_𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑅_𝑉𝐴𝐿
𝑂𝑃𝑇_𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑅_𝑁𝑈𝑀
 
 
The value of the estimated average exercise per exercised option is computed by subtracting the 
per option value realized from the exercise from the fiscal year end stock price:  
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (𝑃𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 – Per option value realized 
from the exercise). 
 
Finally, the average percentage of moneyness of the exercised option is measured as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
. 
3.3 Definition of other variables 
To reduce the possibility of an omitted variables effect in our main results, we use a set of 
control variables including the natural log of total assets (Malmendier & Tate 2005); market to 
book value (Brockman, et al., 2010); natural log of delta (lndelta); natural log of vega (lnvega); 
stock ownership (Huang et al., 2016; Core & Guay, 2002); firm characteristics such as Tobin’s q 
(standard and total q), cashflow (standard and total cashflow), and the investment variables of P-
T; the Z-score of Brockman et al. (2010); and the modified governance index of Cory A. et al. 
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(2012). Our investment variables are physical, intangible, and total investment. The reason for 
using three forms of investment is to measure the magnitude of sensitivity of CEO 
overconfidence to these different types of investments. The definition, computation, motivation, 
and sources of the control variables are provided in the Appendix.  
 
3.4. Sample selection and data sources 
We use several databases to construct our main sample. We obtain monthly stock prices from 
CRSP; firm financial and accounting information from Compustat; CEO options, stocks, and 
compensation information from Execucomp; and risk-free rates from the Federal Reserve Bank 
website3. To create a governance index consisting of the Board of Directors and relevant 
information, we use Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data from WRDS. To compute a 
firm’s total q ratio and the replacement cost of the firm’s intangible capital, we use P-T’s Tobin q 
proxy from WRDS. Our sample covers the period of 2007-2017. The sample begins in 2007 
because ISS data on directors and governance data regarding financial experts on Boards for 
S&P 1500 companies are available from 2007. Moreover, Execucomp provides CEO 
compensation package-level option holding data beginning in 20064 because of a change in the 
reporting requirements by FSA-123R. CEO package-level option holding data is essential for 
computing the proxies for our CEO overconfidence variable. We then combine the CEO data 
from Execucomp with CRSP stock price data and risk-free rate data obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank website to construct our overconfidence proxies and compute the CEO personal 
control variables.   
 
                                                          
3 Risk-free rates are obtained from the Fed Reserve website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm. 
4 Execucomp provides executive compensation data since 1992. However, for the purpose of constructing our CEO 
overconfidence proxies, we need CEO package-level option holding data, which is available from 2006. 
10 
 
In the next step, we merge the dataset with the Compustat database to compute the firm-level 
control variables. We combine this database with P-T’s Tobin q proxy for intangible capital and 
the Governance & Board database obtained from WRDS. P-T use the perpetual inventory of past 
investments in R&D and SG&A to compute the replacement cost of a firm’s intangible capital. 
Following P-T, we exclude regulated utilities firms [SIC:4000-4999], financial firms [SIC: 6000-
6999], and special firms [SIC: 9000+] from the main sample as these firms may not be 
appropriate for  intangible capital measures. We exclude any firms with missing total q as well as 
firms with missing or negative book value/sales/physical assets. Following the suggestion of P-T, 
we winsorize total q as well as all regression variables at the 1% level, except dummy variables.  
 
3.5. Model specification and methods 
To test our main hypothesis that the intangible investment of overconfident CEOs is more 
sensitive to standard cashflow than the physical investment of overconfident CEOs, we develop 
the following regression model; 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽4 + 𝛽5∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑖𝑡 · ∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (1) 
 
Where C is the cashflow (standard cashflow [c*] or total cashflow [ctot]); Q is the Tobin’s q 
(standard q [q*] or total q [qtot]); X is the vector of additional control variables used in the model; 
and ∆ is the proxy variables for CEO overconfidence measures. The vector X includes Z-score, 
governance index, lndelta, lnvega, stock-ownership, and the log of total assets. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. We do not include firm-fixed effects in our proxies for CEO 
overconfidence, which require CEOs to have a long tenure in their firm in order to be identified 
as overconfident (Huang, et al., 2016). The inclusion of firm-fixed effects in the regression 
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model would lack the time series variation necessary to measure the effect of overconfidence.  
However, to control for the time-variant industry effects, we use Fama-French 12 industry5-fixed 
effects. We also use year-fixed effects to control unobserved macroeconomic shock factors. To 
eliminate possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we apply the regression model in two 
steps. First we run a baseline OLS, then we run a separate regression controlling for the industry- 
and year-fixed effects. As a check of robustness, we compute within-firm clustered standard 
errors, which effectively eliminates any serial correlation.   
4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 
Table 1-A 
To measure physical capital stock (Kphy) and intangible capital stock (Kint), we use the Peters and Taylor Total Q 
database from WRDS, available through December 2017. Other firm-level data is obtained from Compustat Global 
data from 2007-2017. Intangible intensity is the ratio of intangible capital stock (Kint) scaled by the total capital 
stock (Kphy+Kint). All the new measures in the table below are scaled by the total capital stock while all the standard 
measures are scaled by the physical capital stock. The numerator for the both the total q and standard q is calculated 
as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus market value of equity (Compustat item prcc_f*csho) minus short-term 
assets (Compustat item act). The denominators for the total q and standard q are total capital stock and physical 
capital stock, respectively. The numerator for physical investment (ιphy) and intangible investment (ιint) are capital 
expenditure (Compustat item capx) and R&D (Compustat item xrd) plus 30% of selling, general, and administrative 
expenses, respectively. Total investment is the sum of ιphy ιint. The numerator of total cash flow is calculated as the 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item ib) plus depreciation (Compustat item dp). We add the tax 
adjusted ιint to get the numerator of the standard cashflow (c ∗) to get the numerator of the total cash flow ( ctot ). Other 
firm characteristics variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Variables Mean Median St.Dev Min Max Skewness 
Intangible capital stock (millions of dollars) 4606.47 1071.91 11545.72 29.73 84330.44 4.92 
Physical capital stock (millions of dollars) 4312.69 795.79 10843.42 17.44 73304.00 4.37 
Intangible intensity 0.57 0.63 0.26 0.01 0.95 -0.59 
Knowledge capital/intangible capital 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.78 1.26 
New measures             
Total q (q tot ) 1.40 0.95 1.52 -0.23 9.03 2.64 
Physical investment ( ιphy ) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.24 2.35 
Intangible investment ( ιint ) 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.31 0.92 
Total investment ( ιtot ) 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.41 1.29 
Total cash flow ( ctot ) 0.17 0.15 0.11 -0.14 0.59 0.90 
Standard measures             
                                                          
5 Our results remain qualitatively the same even if we use Fama-french 48 industries. The FF12 industry 
classification is obtained from Professor French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library 
/det_12_ind_port.html 
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Standard q (q∗) 6.00 2.49 9.87 -0.98 60.44 3.39 
CAPX/PPE (ι∗) 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.36 1.53 
Standard cash flow (c ∗) 0.37 0.25 0.51 -1.12 2.78 1.89 
Other firm characteristics             
Asset Size ($B) 7.80 1.52 4.89 7.66 11.88 0.42 
Z-Score Dummy 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.00 -3.03 
G-Score 3.58 0.97 1.00 4.00 6.00 -0.12 
  
 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
4.1.1. Firm-level summary statistics 
Table 1-A presents firm-level summary statistics.  The mean size of the sample firm-year 
intangible capital stock (Kint) and physical capital stock (Kphy) is USD 4607.862 million and USD 
4314.724 million, respectively. We find that about 57.30% of the total capital stock (Kphy+Kint) 
consists of intangible capital. This means more than half of the capital in our sample firm-year 
data is intangible. Knowledge capital—a part of intangible capital (Kint ) comprising R&D—is 
about 16.3% of the intangible capital, leaving about 83.7% in organization capital. The median 
knowledge capital is only 5.1% because almost 43% of our sample firms do not report R&D. The 
average total q (𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡) is smaller than standard q ( 𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗ ) because the denominator of total q is on 
average 2.06 times larger than the denominator of standard q.  25% of our sample has a standard 
q larger than 6.00 and only 5% of the sample firms has a total q greater than 6. We observe a 
high standard deviation in the standard q (9.87) compared to the total q (1.52). This suggests that 
total q is more consistent and reliable than standard q. When standard deviations are scaled by 
the mean value of the respective Tobin’s q, we observe the standard deviation of the total q is 
52% lower than the standard deviation of the standard q. The average intangible investment (.09) 
is more than twice the average physical investment (.04). Intangible investment has a slightly 
higher standard deviation than physical investment , but the physical investment is more skewed 
to the right. The average asset size (USD 7.8 billion) of the sample firms is relatively large 
because our sample consists mainly of S&P1500 firms.  
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Figure 1 
The figure below shows the mean capital intangibility for the period of 2007 to 2017. We use Fama-French five 
industries for our analysis. Intangible intensity is the ratio of intangible capital stock (Kint) scaled by the total capital 
stock (Kphy+Kint). 
 
 
Figure 2 
The figure below shows the mean total q and standard q for the period of 2007 to 2017. The numerator for the both 
the total q and standard q is calculated as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus market value of equity 
[Compustat item prcc_f*csho] minus short-term assets [Compustat item act]. The denominators for the total q and 
standard q are total capital stock and physical capital stock, respectively. 
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Figure 1 shows that after 2015, we see a faster increase of intangible capital across all industries 
except the consumer industry. Figure 2 shows the movement of total q and standard q over time. 
It is apparent from Figure 2 that as the intangible capital intensity increases, the gap between 
total q and standard q widens. For this reason, we see the gap between these two variables widen  
as the intangible capital intensity increases over the period. Suzuki & Chida (2017) measure 
Tobin’s q by subtracting current assets from the denominator, which is a better proxy than 
simply using totals asset as the denominator (Erickson & M. Whited, 2006). However, as Suzuki 
& Chida (2017) do not consider intangible capital stock in Tobin’s q, their measure can only 
isolate the investment opportunities in physical capital stock, not in the total capital stock.  
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4.1.2. CEO summary statistics 
Table 1-B 
Panel A provides CEO-level summary statistics for the full sample. We further partition the sample into non-
overconfident (Panel B) and overconfident (Panel C) CEOs.  Longholder40 is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the CEO ever held an option to the final year of its duration and the option is at least 40% in the money 
entering its final year, otherwise the value is 0. Longholder100 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO ever held an option to the final year of its duration and the option is more than 100% in the money at least 
twice during the option holding period, otherwise 0. Longholderlow is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the CEO exercises stock options that are less than 30% in the money and the CEO does not hold other exercisable 
options that are more than 30% in the money, otherwise 0. Gender is a dummy variable takes a value of 1 for male 
and 0 otherwise. Stock ownership is measured as the number of shares owned by the CEO, excluding options, 
divided by the common shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. Option ownership is measured as the number 
of exercisable options owned by the CEO divided by the common shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year. Total 
compensation is Execucomp item TDC1. Age and Tenure are CEO age and tenure, respectively. Delta and Vega are 
defined in the Appendix. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
  N Mean   Std. dev Min Median Max Skewness 
Longholder40 9394 0.402   0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.402 
Longholder100 9199 0.173   0.378 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.729 
LongholderLow 9397 0.045   0.208 0.000 0.000 1.000 4.365 
Gender 9397 0.964   0.186 0.000 1.000 1.000 -5.000 
Age 9393 56.253   6.897 32.000 56.000 88.000 0.332 
Tenure 9376 11.737   7.827 0.083 10.167 55.833 1.492 
Delta($000) 9397 618.573   1182.754 0.544 224.836 8120.253 4.380 
Vega($000) 9397 91.523   198.790 0.000 16.328 1154.286 3.623 
Stock Ownership 9366 0.015   0.036 0.000 0.003 0.244 4.368 
Option Ownership 9396 0.009   0.011 0.000 0.005 0.063 2.280 
Total Compensation ($000) 9397 6388.943   5588.980 328.582 4761.806 29497.570 1.857 
 
Panel B: Non-overconfident CEOs 
  N Mean   Std. dev Min Median Max Skewness 
Gender 5622 0.962   0.190 0.000 1.000 1.000 -4.867 
Age 5618 56.197   6.904 32.000 56.000 84.000 0.357 
Tenure 5608 11.322   7.783 0.083 9.833 55.833 1.464 
Delta($000) 5622 400.316   905.155 0.544 139.173 8120.253 6.027 
Vega($000) 5622 87.520   177.030 0.000 20.272 1154.286 3.653 
Stock Ownership 5596 0.014   0.035 0.000 0.003 0.244 4.426 
Option Ownership 5621 0.008   0.011 0.000 0.004 0.063 2.393 
Total Compensation ($000) 5622 5967.369   5339.254 328.582 4377.852 29497.570 1.926 
                  
 
 
 
Panel C: Overconfident CEOs (Longholder40) 
  N Mean   Std. dev Min Median Max Skewness 
Gender 3772 0.967   0.178 0.000 1.000 1.000 -5.240 
Age 3772 56.339   6.888 34.000 56.000 88.000 0.295 
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Tenure 3765 12.360 *** 7.852 0.250 10.667 55.833 1.550 
Delta($000) 3772 944.311 *** 1444.625 2.530 456.349 8120.253 3.362 
Vega($000) 3772 97.561 *** 227.338 0.000 10.970 1154.286 3.433 
Stock Ownership 3767 0.015 * 0.037 0.000 0.003 0.244 4.276 
Option Ownership 3772 0.011 *** 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.063 2.225 
Total Compensation ($000) 3772 7018.881 *** 5888.079 328.582 5348.157 29497.570 1.758 
 
Table 1-B presents CEO-level summary statistics.  We find approximately 40% of the CEOs in 
our sample are longholder40. The mean Delta (portfolio price sensitivity) for the full sample is 
619—very close to what is reported (691.4) by Brockman et al. (2010) and slightly higher than 
that reported (577.46) by Huang et al. (2016). Our mean Vega (portfolio volatility sensitivity) is 
92—slightly lower than the Vega (110.8) reported by Brockman et al. (2010). Since our sample 
begins in 2007 and is recession free for most of the time, the volatility sensitivity is lower. The 
average stock ownership of the CEOs in our sample is 1.5% and the average option ownership is 
0.9%. Most of the CEOs in our sample are male (96%) and middle-aged (average age 56.25 
years). The average CEO tenure is 11.74 years and total compensation is about USD 6.389 
million.  
 
Panels B and C of Table 1-B present the summary statistics for the non-overconfident and 
overconfident CEOs, respectively. The average overconfident CEOs are slightly older and male-
dominated, but both belong to the middle-aged group. We would expect the overconfident CEOs 
to be older and have more tenure than the non-overconfident CEOs, given that the overconfident 
CEOs hold on to their options until the final year of the options’ expiration. Our subsample of 
overconfident CEOs has a higher Delta and Vega than the non-overconfident subsample—a 
result similar to Huang et al. (2016). As expected, we find the overconfident CEOs have higher 
Delta and Vega given their higher stocks and options ownership. Though we observe statistically 
significant differences between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs with regard to tenure 
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and total compensation, we do not include these variables in the investment regression as control 
variables because, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical justification for doing so exists in 
the literature.  
Table 1-C 
This table presents the distribution of overconfident CEOs across the Fama-French 12 industry groups 
Distribution Across Fama-French Industry 
Groups 
Non-overconfident 
CEOs 
Overconfident 
CEOs 
Full 
Sample 
Consumer Nondurables 4.50% 3.15% 7.65% 
Consumer Durables 1.88% 1.34% 3.23% 
Manufacturing 9.00% 6.50% 15.50% 
Energy 3.36% 1.69% 5.06% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 2.41% 2.13% 4.53% 
Business Equipment 13.52% 9.02% 22.54% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 1.35% 0.60% 1.95% 
Shops 9.66% 6.11% 15.77% 
Health 4.93% 5.10% 10.03% 
Other 9.24% 4.51% 13.75% 
Total 59.85% 40.15% 100.00% 
 
Table 1-C presents the distribution of overconfident CEO across the Fama-French 12 industry 
groups. The distribution of the overconfident CEO subsample is similar across the 12 industries 
with a standard deviation of .04. This suggests orthogonality of the overconfidence measures to 
the firm characteristics across the 12 Fama-French industries.  
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Table 2 
Pairwise Correlation among the three overconfidence measures (longholder40, longholder100, longholder_low) and firm and CEO characteristics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Longholder40 1            
(2) Longholder100 0.573* 1           
(3) Longholder_low -0.179* -0.101* 1          
(4) Physical (ιphy) 0.034* 0.065* 0.006 1         
(5) Intangible (ιint) 0.072* 0.098* -0.029* -0.185* 1        
(6) Total (ιtot) 0.087* 0.131* -0.024* 0.452* 0.782* 1       
(7) Total q (qtot ) 0.242* 0.277* -0.067* 0.122* 0.366* 0.404* 1      
(8) Standard q (q∗) 0.195* 0.234* -0.053* -0.142* 0.426* 0.303* 0.727* 1     
(9) Total cash flow (ctot) 0.193* 0.202* -0.033* 0.152* 0.566* 0.598* 0.648* 0.443* 1    
(10) Standard cash flow (c∗) 0.172* 0.175* -0.028* -0.107* 0.344* 0.244* 0.497* 0.691* 0.691* 1   
(11) LogAsset 0.050* -0.031* 0.030* 0.051* -0.334* -0.271* -0.030* -0.050* -0.089* 0.022 1 
(12) G-score -0.025* -0.037* 0.008 -0.025* -0.097* -0.101* -0.050* -0.033* -0.045* 0.006 0.162* 1 
(13) Z_Score_dummy 0.116* 0.061* -0.034* -0.090* 0.188* 0.104* 0.078* 0.013 0.283* 0.169* -0.098* -0.006 
(14) Gender 0.012 0.028* 0.00 -0.018 0.024* 0.01 0.038* 0.028* 0.016 0.027* 0.012 -0.018 
(15) Age 0.01 -0.003 0.016 -0.024* -0.109* -0.112* -0.057* -0.062* -0.072* -0.067* 0.080* 0.034* 
(16) Tenure 0.065* 0.114* 0.039* 0.050* 0.102* 0.121* 0.063* 0.068* 0.069* 0.047* -0.143* -0.115* 
(17) Delta 0.225* 0.220* -0.040* 0.092* 0.039* 0.088* 0.253* 0.173* 0.140* 0.109* 0.277* -0.039* 
(18) Vega 0.025* -0.055* 0.019 -0.050* -0.044* -0.073* 0.028* 0.025* 0.009 0.042* 0.381* 0.082* 
(19) Stock-ownership 0.015 0.063* -0.006 0.073* 0.095* 0.131* 0.037* 0.018 0.044* -0.011 -0.224* -0.147* 
(20) Option-ownership 0.126* 0.141* 0.023* -0.090* 0.156* 0.085* -0.011 0.077* -0.007 -0.001 -0.336* -0.102* 
(21) Total Compensation 0.092* 0.041* 0.009 -0.008 -0.100* -0.097* 0.129* 0.122* 0.053* 0.130* 0.702* 0.145* 
 
Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(14) Gender -0.023* 1       
(15) Age 0.049* 0.052* 1      
(16) Tenure 0.027* 0.072* 0.317* 1     
(17) Delta 0.079* 0.031* 0.165* 0.327* 1    
(18) Vega 0.021 -0.024* 0.030* -0.015 0.256* 1   
(19) Stock-ownship 0.024* 0.025* 0.191* 0.472* 0.476* -0.067* 1 
(20) Option-ownship -0.025* 0.01 0.035* 0.243* 0.097* 0.061* 0.192* 1 
(21) Total Compensation -0.009 -0.025* 0.075* -0.043* 0.351* 0.404* -0.125* -0.149* 
* shows significance at the 5% level 
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4.2. Pairwise Correlation 
In Table 2, we present the correlations among the three overconfidence measures, firm 
characteristics, and CEO personal characteristics. As predicted, we find the correlation between 
longholder40 and longholder100 is strong (0.57) and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
correlation of longholder40 and longholder100 with longholderlow is negative (-0.179 and -
0.101, respectively) and highly statistically significant. All the longholders are positively 
correlated with physical investment while longholderlow is negatively correlated with intangible 
investment. Overall, these relations suggest that, unlike longholderlow, the overconfidence 
measures longholder40 and longholder100 capture the same effect. Cashflow is strongly 
positively correlated with longholder40 and longholder100 and negatively correlated with 
longholderlow. Governance (G-score) acts as a speed breaker for CEO overconfidence as we see 
G-score is only positively correlated with longholderlow and strongly negatively correlated with 
other two longholders. Although we cannot simply test whether an overconfident CEO destroys 
firm value or not because of endogeneity, we see a strong and positive correlation of Tobin’s q 
and longholder40 and longholder100. Tobin’s q is strongly negatively correlated with 
longholderlow. Overall, we find several dependable correlations between the overconfidence 
measures and firm and CEO characteristics. However, these relationships are not always 
consistent among all the subsamples. This suggests that we cannot reliably use the CEO 
overconfidence measures as proxies for the observable firm or CEO characteristics. Technically, 
an overconfident CEO such as a longholder40 or longholder100 who delays the exercising of 
options usually increases her ownership in the firm. However, there are other firm and CEO 
characteristics that play a significant role in holding these positions. These counterintuitive 
relationships among the subgroups make it plausible that there are inconsistent correlations 
among the stock or option ownership measures and the longholder measures.  
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5. Persistence of Option Exercising Behavior 
Our longholder measures may be biased estimators in the case of CEOs with insider information. 
If the CEO has positive insider information, the option exercising may be delayed. If the CEO 
possesses negative insider information, sometimes the CEO may choose to exercise options 
early. We can test the behavior of the CEO by running a probit regression that explains the 
circumstances affecting whether a Longholder40 has ever held an option to the final year of its 
duration, with that option being at least 40% in the money entering its final year. Similarly, the 
probit regression can shed light on the factors surrounding a Longholder100 holding an option to 
the final year of its duration with the option being more than 100% in the money at least twice 
during the option holding period, as well as when a Longholderlow exercises stock options that 
are less than 30% in the money while the CEO does not hold other exercisable options that are 
more than 30% in the money.  
Table 3 
In Panel A & B, the dependent variables the three overconfidence (longholder) measures. Longholder40 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO has ever held an option to the final year of its duration with that option 
being at least 40% in the money entering its final year, otherwise it takes the value 0. Longholder100 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO has ever held an option to the final year of its duration with that option 
being more than 100% in the money at least twice during the option holding period, otherwise it takes the value 0. 
Longholderlow is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO exercises stock options that are less than 30% 
in the money provided that the CEO does not hold other exercisable options that are more than 30% in the money, 
otherwise it takes the value 0. Total q (qtot) and Standard q (q∗) are two measures of Tobin’s q. Earnings/price ratio is 
the earnings to price ratio during the fiscal year. Panel C represents the summary of the longholder’s persistence of 
late exercise behavior. 
Panel A: Random Effects Probit Regression 
  Sample: Observations with Longholders 
  Longholder40 Longholder100 Longholder_low 
Past exercise behavior 0.2177*** 0.492*** 0.0770*** 
  (0.017) (0.042) (0.016) 
Total q (qtot) 0.4617*** 0.616*** -0.227*** 
  (0.030) (0.045) (0.042) 
Earnings/price ratio 1.7305*** 3.327*** 0.437* 
  (0.271) (0.696) (0.257) 
 Panel B: Random Effects Probit Regression       
  Longholder40 Longholder100 Longholder_low 
Past exercise behavior 0.222*** 0.474*** 0.0798*** 
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  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Standard q (q∗) 0.0503*** 0.0631*** -0.0239*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Earnings/price ratio 1.923*** 3.072*** 0.288 
  (0.26) (0.60) (0.26) 
        
Observations 6,897 6778 6898 
Number of CEOs 1765  1749 1765 
 
Table 3 presents the random effects probit regression results. In Panels A and B, the dependent 
variables are the three overconfidence (longholders) measures. Total q (qtot) and Standard q (q∗) 
are two measures of Tobin’s q. Earnings/price ratio is the earnings to price ratio during the fiscal 
year. Past exercise behavior tells us the number of times a CEO delayed exercising in the money 
options in the past. The past exercise behavior coefficients for all the longholders are strongly 
significant with p-values less than .01. This result supports our argument that longholders exhibit 
persistence in their option exercising behavior. As a robustness check, we include total cashflow 
and standard cashflow in Panels A and B, respectively, along with the earnings/price ratio. 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005 argue that a high value of Tobin’s q indicates market overvaluation 
and is negatively correlated with past exercise behavior. If the firm is overvalued, a CEO should 
not delay exercising exercisable unexercised options.  We observe the same predicted 
relationship between Tobin’s q and longholderlow and longholder100. On the contrary, the 
earnings/price ratio and delayed option exercising behavior trend in the same direction. In Panels 
A and B, the earnings/price ratio is significant for longholder40 and longholder100.  
 
Longholder: We estimate our model using the three different versions of longholders as our 
proxy measures for CEO overconfidence.  The definitions of the three categories of longholders 
are provided in the Appendix. We run two sets of base regressions for each of the three types of 
investment dependent variables. We run the regression on the existing literature’s standard 
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cashflow (c*) and standard q (q*) with industry and year fixed effects, first with no controls and 
then with controls for lndelta, lnvega, stock-ownership, G-score, Z-score, logAssets, and 
longholders interactions with the cashflow. It is important to keep in mind that the measures of 
standard cashflow and standard q do not include intangible capital in the calculation. The results 
are presented in the Table 4, Panel A. 
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Table 4 
Panel A 
This table presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression of the column variables on the beginning of the year Tobin’s q, cashflow, firm and CEO characteristic 
variables, longholders, and industry and year fixed effects. All the column variables in the table below are scaled by total capital stock (Kphy+Kint). The numerator for both the total 
q and standard q is calculated as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus market value of equity [Compustat item prcc_f*csho] minus short-term assets [Compustat item act]. The 
denominators for the total q and standard q are total capital stock (Kphy+Kint) and physical capital stock (Kphy), respectively. The numerator for physical investment (ιphy) and 
intangible investment (ιint) are Capital expenditure [Compustat item capx] and R&D [Compustat item xrd] plus 30% of selling, general, and administrative expenses, respectively. 
Total investment (itot) is the sum of ιphy and ιint. Longholder40 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever held an option to the final year of its duration and the 
option is at least 40% in the money entering its final year, otherwise 0. Longholder100 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever held an option to the final year of 
its duration and the option is more than 100% in the money at least twice during the option holding period, otherwise 0. Longholderlow is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the CEO exercises stock options that are less than 30% in the money and the CEO does not hold other exercisable options that are more than 30% in the money, and otherwise 0. 
Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The regression results for total q (qtot) and total cash flow (ctot) are presented in Panel A while the results for standard q (q*) 
and standard cashflow (c*) are presented in panel B. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are indicated as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A:  Base Regression Longholder40 
   ιphy  ιint  ιtot   ιphy  ιint  ιtot  
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects,            
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
                          
Total cashflow (ctot) 0.0662*** 0.0723*** 0.2587*** 0.2638*** 0.3312*** 0.3441*** 0.0730*** 0.0823*** 0.2308*** 0.2376*** 0.3097*** 0.3281*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0353) (0.0068) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0090) (0.0091) 
Total q (qtot) 0.1066** 0.0196 0.234 0.4198*** 0.3708*** 0.4749*** 0.1127*** 0.0411 0.2055*** 0.3602*** 0.3482*** 0.4367*** 
  (0.0416) (0.0429) (0.3944) (0.0523) (0.0605) (0.0613) (0.0425) (0.0435) (0.0522) (0.0528) (0.0617) (0.0621) 
Log Assets 
 
-0.0132 
 
-0.0825*** 
 
-0.1064*** 
 
-0.0126 
 
-0.0828*** 
 
-0.1058*** 
  
 
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0163) 
 
(0.0191) 
 
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0162) 
 
(0.0191) 
Lndelta 
 
0.1597*** 
 
-0.6319*** 
 
-0.5039*** 
 
0.1419*** 
 
-0.6073*** 
 
-0.5026*** 
  
 
(0.0369) 
 
(0.0450) 
 
(0.0527) 
 
(0.0398) 
 
(0.0483) 
 
(0.0568) 
Lnvega 
 
-0.1282*** 
 
0.1074*** 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.1273*** 
 
0.1092*** 
 
-0.0224 
  
 
(0.0211) 
 
(0.0257) 
 
(0.0301) 
 
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0258) 
 
(0.0304) 
Stock-ownship 
 
0.0718*** 
 
0.2087*** 
 
0.2918*** 
 
0.0764*** 
 
0.2002*** 
 
0.2888*** 
  
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.0215) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0186) 
 
(0.0218) 
G-score 
 
-0.1308*** 
 
-0.2898*** 
 
-0.4123*** 
 
-0.1310*** 
 
-0.2889*** 
 
-0.4114*** 
  
 
(0.0468) 
 
(0.0570) 
 
(0.0669) 
 
(0.0468) 
 
(0.0569) 
 
(0.0668) 
Z-score 
 
-1.0155*** 
 
0.1588 
 
-1.0169*** 
 
-1.0598*** 
 
0.2697 
 
-0.9530*** 
  
 
(0.1686) 
 
(0.2053) 
 
(0.2407) 
 
(0.1690) 
 
(0.2052) 
 
(0.2412) 
Longholder40 
      
0.5348*** 0.5490*** -2.1339*** -1.2860*** -1.6225*** -0.6861*** 
  
      
(0.1731) (0.1788) (0.2127) (0.2172) (0.2514) (0.2553) 
(Longholder40)*(ctot) 
      
-0.0229*** -0.0296*** 0.0934*** 0.0771*** 0.0716*** 0.0466*** 
 
      
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0128) (0.0126) 
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Year Fixed effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 
Adj. R-squared 0.266 0.282 0.453 0.482 0.398 0.434 0.267 0.283 0.4605 0.4856 0.4018 0.4353 
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Table 4: Panel A …continued 
 Longholder100 Longholder_low 
  ιphy ιint ιtot ιphy ιint ιtot 
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Total cashflow (ctot) 0.0655*** 0.0726*** 0.2459*** 0.2522*** 0.3168*** 0.3324*** 0.0678*** 0.0733*** 0.2641*** 0.2689*** 0.3380*** 0.3502*** 
  (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Total q (qtot) 0.0764* 0.0127 0.1983*** 0.3564*** 0.3005*** 0.4007*** 0.1046** 0.0194 0.2139*** 0.4021*** 0.3488*** 0.4572*** 
  (0.0429) (0.0439) (0.0530) (0.0534) (0.0623) (0.0625) (0.0417) (0.0431) (0.0516) (0.0524) (0.0607) (0.0614) 
Log Assets  -0.0081  -0.0854***  -0.1026***  -0.014  -0.0807***  -0.1055*** 
   (0.0135)  (0.0164)  (0.0192)  (0.0134)  (0.0163)  (0.0191) 
Lndelta  0.1444***  -0.6122***  -0.5042***  0.1610***  -0.6355***  -0.5062*** 
   (0.0390)  (0.0474)  (0.0555)  (0.0369)  (0.0449)  (0.0527) 
Lnvega  -0.1189***  0.1098***  -0.0114  -0.1294***  0.1121***  -0.0227 
   (0.0220)  (0.0268)  (0.0314)  (0.0211)  (0.0257)  (0.0301) 
Stock-ownship  0.0756***  0.2018***  0.2893***  0.0712***  0.2084***  0.2909*** 
   (0.0152)  (0.0186)  (0.0217)  (0.0151)  (0.0184)  (0.0215) 
G-score  -0.1309***  -0.2988***  -0.4215***  -0.1316***  -0.2898***  -0.4132*** 
   (0.0472)  (0.0574)  (0.0672)  (0.0468)  (0.0570)  (0.0668) 
Z-score  -0.9578***  0.1973  -0.9257***  -1.0092***  0.1715  -0.9980*** 
   (0.1703)  (0.2072)  (0.2426)  (0.1686)  (0.2051)  (0.2405) 
Longholder100 0.189 0.045 -2.2903*** -1.3981*** -2.1724*** -1.3588***             
  (0.2518) (0.2558) (0.3110) (0.3112) (0.3657) (0.3643)             
(Longholder100)*(ctot) 0.0106  0.0046  0.1008*** 0.0817*** 0.1172*** 0.0899***             
  (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0168) (0.0164)             
Longholder-low 0.189 0.045 -2.2903*** -1.3981*** -2.1724*** -1.3588*** 0.6625* 0.6133* 1.0222** 1.0090** 1.7004*** 1.6316*** 
              (0.3664) (0.3628) (0.4529) (0.4414) (0.5329) (0.5175) 
(Longholder-low)*(ctot)             -0.029 -0.021 -0.1046*** -0.1017*** -0.1344*** -0.1218*** 
              (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0267) (0.0260) (0.0314) (0.0305) 
Year Fixed effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 
Adj. R-squared 0.2693 0.2837 0.4569 0.4837 0.4032 0.4379 0.2664 0.2822 0.4542 0.4831 0.3998 0.4355 
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Panel B 
  Base Regression Longholder40 
  ιphy ιint ιtot ιphy ιint ιtot 
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects,            
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Standard cash flow 
(c∗) 
-0.0016 -0.0022* 0.0057*** 0.0045*** 0.0040** 
0.0024 
0.0002 -0.0003 0.0119*** 0.0108*** 0.0122*** 
0.0109*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Standard q (q∗) 
-0.0455*** -0.0615*** 0.2022*** 0.2155*** 0.1627*** 0.1594*** -0.0458*** 
-
0.0590*** 0.2145*** 0.2262*** 0.1751*** 0.1731*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
Log Assets  -0.0356***  -0.0925***  -0.1398***   -0.0331**  -0.0909***  -0.1354*** 
   (0.0134)  (0.0179)  (0.0227)   (0.0134)  (0.0179)  (0.0227) 
Lndelta  0.4451***  -0.3516***  0.0811   0.3931***  -0.4129***  -0.041 
   (0.0358)  (0.0476)  (0.0605)   (0.0389)  (0.0517)  (0.0657) 
Lnvega 
 -0.1983***  0.0445  -0.1637***   
-
0.1888***  0.0551*  -0.1419*** 
   (0.0210)  (0.0280)  (0.0356)   (0.0212)  (0.0282)  (0.0358) 
Stock_ownship  0.0316**  0.1695***  0.2096***   0.0406***  0.1815***  0.2321*** 
   (0.0151)  (0.0201)  (0.0256)   (0.0153)  (0.0203)  (0.0258) 
Gvscore 
 -0.1633***  -0.3934***  -0.5529***   
-
0.1593***  -0.3818***  -0.5365*** 
   (0.0470)  (0.0627)  (0.0796)   (0.0470)  (0.0625)  (0.0793) 
Z-score  -0.3714**  2.5148***  2.0584***   -0.4199**  2.3906***  1.8771*** 
   (0.1665)  (0.2218)  (0.2819)   (0.1670)  (0.2219)  (0.2817) 
Longholder40             0.8982*** 0.4687*** 0.5000*** 0.8310*** 1.4425*** 1.3804*** 
              (0.1141) (0.1214) (0.1528) (0.1614) (0.1937) (0.2049) 
(Longholder40)*(c∗)             
-0.0059*** 
-
0.0047*** -0.0159*** -0.0158*** -0.0224*** -0.0214*** 
              (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year Fixed effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 6898 6898 6898 6898 6898 6898 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 6,897 
Adj. R-squared 0.24  0.27  0.34  0.37  0.16  0.20  0.2519 0.2764 0.3471 0.3777 0.1665 0.2033 
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Table 4: Panel B…continued 
  Longholder100 Longholder_low 
   ιphy  ιint  ιtot   ιphy  ιint  ιtot  
VARIABLES 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
No 
Controls 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Controls 
Standard cash flow 
(c∗) 
-0.0010 -0.0017 0.0088*** 0.0077*** 0.0077*** 
0.0064*** 
-0.0009 -0.0016 0.0055*** 0.0043*** 0.0044** 
0.0028 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Standard q (q∗) -0.0531*** -0.0646*** 0.2163*** 0.2279*** 0.1693*** 0.1690*** -0.0470*** -0.0626*** 0.2021*** 0.2155*** 0.1613*** 0.1585*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Log Assets  -0.0284**  -0.0978***  -0.1364***   -0.0356***  -0.0913***  -0.1387*** 
   (0.0136)  (0.0180)  (0.0229)   (0.0134)  (0.0179)  (0.0228) 
Lndelta  0.3919***  -0.3907***  -0.0196   0.4447***  -0.3543***  0.0783 
   (0.0381)  (0.0505)  (0.0642)   (0.0358)  (0.0477)  (0.0606) 
Lnvega  -0.1719***  0.0587**  -0.1190***   -0.1987***  0.0471*  -0.1617*** 
   (0.0220)  (0.0292)  (0.0371)   (0.0211)  (0.0281)  (0.0357) 
Stock_ownship  0.0400***  0.1704***  0.2201***   0.0311**  0.1703***  0.2099*** 
   (0.0152)  (0.0202)  (0.0257)   (0.0151)  (0.0201)  (0.0256) 
Gvscore  -0.1663***  -0.3879***  -0.5502***   -0.1662***  -0.3914***  -0.5535*** 
   (0.0474)  (0.0629)  (0.0799)   (0.0470)  (0.0627)  (0.0797) 
Z-score  -0.3315**  2.4177***  1.9897***   -0.3658**  2.5081***  2.0569*** 
   (0.1681)  (0.2230)  (0.2833)   (0.1665)  (0.2218)  (0.2819) 
Longholder100 -0.0010 -0.0017 0.0088*** 0.0077*** 0.0077*** 0.0064*** -0.0009 -0.0016 0.0055*** 0.0043*** 0.0044** 0.0028 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
(Longholder100)*(c∗) -0.0531*** -0.0646*** 0.2163*** 0.2279*** 0.1693*** 0.1690*** -0.0470*** -0.0626*** 0.2021*** 0.2155*** 0.1613*** 0.1585*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Longholder_low  -0.0284**  -0.0978***  -0.1364***   -0.0356***  -0.0913***  -0.1387*** 
   (0.0136)  (0.0180)  (0.0229)   (0.0134)  (0.0179)  (0.0228) 
Longholder_low*(c∗)  0.3919***  -0.3907***  -0.0196   0.4447***  -0.3543***  0.0783 
   (0.0381)  (0.0505)  (0.0642)   (0.0358)  (0.0477)  (0.0606) 
Year Fixed effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,778 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 6,898 
Adj. R-squared 0.2548 0.2778 0.3499 0.3802 0.1696 0.2051 0.2455 0.2755 0.3436 0.3742 0.1588 0.1968 
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In Table 4, Panel B, we repeat the methodology of Panel A but replace total cashflow (ctot) and 
total q (qtot) with standard cashflow (c*) and standard q (q*). The first base regression in Panel B 
reconfirms the prevailing view found in the literature on investment-standard q sensitivity—
namely, that standard q has strong explanatory power for physical investments. Moreover, our 
results also confirm that total cashflow (ctot) can explain the intangible and total investments of a 
firm better than total q (qtot). The denominator for both qtot and ctot is Ktot (total capital stock). 
Among the control variables, delta indicates the change in a CEO’s stock and option portfolio 
due to a 1% increase in the price of the firm’s common stock. Vega represents the changes in a 
CEO’s stocks and options due to a 1% increase in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s 
stock return. The relationship between delta and vega is negative. High delta discourages CEO 
risk taking, whereas high vega encourages risk taki/ng. Generally, higher portfolio volatility 
sensitivity and higher use of stock options make intangible investments more sensitive than 
physical investments. We find that CEO stock ownership and vega are less sensitive to physical 
investments than intangible investments. The negative sign of delta for intangible investments 
confirms greater risk-taking behavior on the part of CEOs. We observe that the more 
overconfident the CEO of a company, the more sensitive the relationship between total cashflow 
(ctot) and physical investments. Our findings are similar to Malmendier & Tate (2005) who only 
consider physical investments. Our additional contribution to the literature is revealing that such 
a relationship becomes stronger when a CEO makes decisions about intangible investment. 
Governance and Z-score play a role in there being lower levels of intangible investment 
compared to physical investment. In an environment with greater corporate governance, CEOs 
tend to invest less in intangibles. 
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 Our results are weaker in Table 4, Panel B compared to Panel A. In Panel B, we scale standard q 
(q*) and standard cashflow (c*) by physical capital stock (Kphy) instead of the total capital stock 
(Ktot) we use in Panel A. A significant difference between the results of these two tables is 
consistent with the findings of P-T, who document that in general, total q (qtot) delivers a higher 
R2 than q*. This means that using total q (qtot) explains investment opportunities better than 
using standard q (q*). The negative coefficient of logged total assets suggests that firms decrease 
investments when the firm size is large (Huang, et al., 2016). One possible interpretation here is 
that size captures the greater financing constraints in the investment (Malmendier & Tate, 2005).  
 
Next, we explain the coefficients obtained from the interaction between the three types of 
overconfidence measures (longholders) and cashflow sensitivity. In Table 4, Panel A, the 
interaction terms with the control variables are significant and coefficients are positive and 
higher for longholder100 than longholder40 for intangible and total investments. For 
longholderlow, the coefficients are significant and negative for intangible and total investments, 
but insignificant for physical investments. We can interpret such results as meaning that a 
longholderlow CEO has lower investment-cashflow sensitivity. In fact, longholderlow displays 
negative investment-cashflow sensitivity for intangible and total investments. The results also 
suggest that unlike intangible and total investment, physical investment is more sensitive to 
cashflow when the CEO is a longholder40. On the other hand, longholder100 CEOs display 
similar behavior regarding physical investments as longholderlow CEOs, but unlike 
longholderlow CEOs they show positive and significant investment-cashflow sensitivity for 
intangible and total investments. This is not surprising, as one would expect that longholderlow 
and longholder100, being the two extremes of the overconfidence measure, would exhibit 
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contrasting results, whereas the longholder40 measure sufficiently explains investment-cashflow 
sensitivity for all three types of investments.  
 
6. What else may cause the investment and overconfidence relationship? 
Our overconfidence measures are based on the CEO’s option exercise behavior. It is reasonable 
to ask whether our results are correlated with other omitted variables. The results could come 
from the CEO’s insider information, CEO’s casual behavior (very unlikely), or other factors than 
the CEO’s overconfidence. To justify our conclusions about investment-cashflow sensitivity for 
our longholder measures, we provide alternative explanations that may cause the results (Huang, 
et al., 2016). We show that our findings are robust to these alternative explanations.  
 
The first alternative explanation is private information. Why might a CEO delay the exercise of 
an option? Does the CEO have private information? Malmendier & Tate (2005) rule out this 
possibility, arguing that private information is mostly transitory and hardly survives when we use 
fixed effects controls. Therefore, it is unlikely that a CEO would display repeated late exercise 
behavior over a considerably large period; thus, an option-based measure of CEO 
overconfidence is not biased towards private information (Huang, et al., 2016). 
   
Another potential alternate explanation has to do with risk-taking. Is a CEO actually a risk taker 
rather than merely being overconfident? Our longholder40 measure explains the CEO’s option 
exercising behavior by depicting the scenario in which a CEO does not exercise options even if 
they are 40% in the money. One may argue that longholder100 describes extreme risk tolerant 
behavior in that such CEOs delay exercising their options at least twice during the option holding 
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period even if the options are 100% in the money.  It may seem obvious that what we label as 
“overconfident” CEOs are risk takers rather than overconfident, assuming a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) 3 for all CEOs (Hall & Murphy, 2002). This risk-taking behavior of 
overconfident CEOs lead to them being imprudent and rash about increasing exposure to firm-
specific risk. In the next section we will show that CEOs of financially constrained firms are less 
likely to increase investment—a finding that completely contradicts the risk tolerance 
hypothesis. The above explanation concludes that overconfidence is different from risk taking 
behavior.   
 
We also reject the hypothesis that CEO overconfidence is simply part of an organized strategy to 
signal the market. This hypothesis holds that a CEO may be motivated by their own self-interest 
or may acquiesce to pressure from the Board of Directors to hold deep in the money unexercised 
exercisable options as a way to signal the market about the positive prospects of the firm. 
According to Malmendier & Tate (2005), the signaling theory does not effectively capture the 
investment-cashflow sensitivity in most cases. If overconfidence is used as a signaling device, 
then it should remove information asymmetry and eradicate investment-cashflow sensitivity for 
the overconfident CEO’s firm.  
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Table 5 
Table 5 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression of the column variables on the beginning of the year Tobin’s q, cashflow, firm and CEO characteristics, 
longholders,, and industry and year fixed effects. Firms are sorted into quartiles following the Kaplan–Zingales index. Quartile 1 indicates least financially constrained and 
Quartile 4 indicates most financially constrained. All column variables in the table below are scaled by total capital stock (Kphy+Kint). The numerator for both total q and standard q 
is calculated as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus market value of equity [Compustat item prcc_f*csho] minus short-term assets [Compustat item act]. The denominators 
for the total q and standard q are total capital stock (Kphy+Kint) and physical capital stock (Kphy), respectively. The numerator for physical investment (ιphy) and intangible 
investment (ιint) are Capital expenditure [Compustat item capx] and R&D [Compustat item xrd] plus 30% of selling, general, and administrative expenses, respectively. Total 
investment (itot) is the sum of ιphy and ιint. Longholder40 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever held an option to the final year of its duration with the option 
being at least 40% in the money entering its final year, and otherwise takes the value 0. Longholder100 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever held an option to 
the final year of its duration with the option being more than 100% in the money at least twice during the option holding period, and otherwise takes the value 0. Longholderlow is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO exercises stock options that are less than 30% in the money provided the CEO does not hold other exercisable options that are 
more than 30% in the money, and otherwise takes the value 0. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The regression results on total q (qtot) and total cashflow (ctot) 
are presented in Panel A while the results of standard q (q*) and standard cashflow (c*) are presented in Panel B. Standard errors are in parentheses. P-values are indicated as *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A 
Longholder40 (OLS with Fixed Effect) 
  Physical investment ( ιphy ) Intangible investment ( ιint ) Total investment ( ιtot ) 
VARIABLES 
Least 
Constrained(1) 
2 3 
Most 
Constrained(4) 
Least 
Constrained(1) 
2 3 
Most 
Constrained(4) 
Least 
Constrained(1) 
2 3 
Most 
Constrained(4) 
Total cashflow (ctot) 0.0869*** 0.0740*** 0.0718*** 0.0890*** 0.3047*** 0.2535*** 0.2771*** 0.2749*** 0.3927*** 0.3306*** 0.3601*** 0.3735*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0211) (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.0208) (0.0244) 
Total q (qtot) 0.0746 -0.0059 -0.1243 0.2713** -0.3734*** 0.2653* -0.0344 0.0851 -0.2855** 0.3174** -0.1664 0.4120** 
  (0.0892) (0.1067) (0.1285) (0.1277) (0.1041) (0.1365) (0.1779) (0.1570) (0.1173) (0.1509) (0.1931) (0.1810) 
Log Assets 0.0273 -0.0029 -0.01 -0.018 -0.0414* -0.0484 -0.2025*** -0.0341 -0.0149 -0.0599 -0.2082*** -0.055 
  (0.0202) (0.0289) (0.0319) (0.0338) (0.0236) (0.0370) (0.0442) (0.0416) (0.0266) (0.0409) (0.0480) (0.0480) 
Lndelta 0.2401*** 0.2532*** 0.2756*** -0.010 -0.2617*** -0.5181*** -1.1170*** -0.4927*** -0.010 -0.2833** -0.8566*** -0.5714*** 
  (0.0709) (0.0855) (0.0965) (0.0969) (0.0827) (0.1093) (0.1337) (0.1192) (0.0932) (0.1208) (0.1451) (0.1374) 
Lnvega -0.0993*** -0.1660*** -0.1683*** -0.0504 0.0374 0.0994* 0.2516*** 0.0379 -0.0626 -0.0607 0.0914 -0.0353 
  (0.0312) (0.0449) (0.0524) (0.0511) (0.0364) (0.0574) (0.0726) (0.0628) (0.0411) (0.0635) (0.0788) (0.0724) 
Stock-ownship -0.0384 0.0421 0.0452 0.1613*** 0.1192*** 0.2357*** 0.2672*** 0.0491 0.0787** 0.2854*** 0.3156*** 0.2294*** 
  (0.0300) (0.0310) (0.0326) (0.0354) (0.0350) (0.0396) (0.0452) (0.0435) (0.0395) (0.0438) (0.0490) (0.0501) 
G-score -0.3494*** -0.1169 -0.0329 -0.0023 -0.1414 -0.198 -0.4707*** -0.5084*** -0.4937*** -0.3227** -0.5086*** -0.4773*** 
  (0.0832) (0.0988) (0.1035) (0.1049) (0.0971) (0.1264) (0.1434) (0.1290) (0.1094) (0.1397) (0.1557) (0.1487) 
Z-score -1.1896*** -1.9960*** -0.8892 -0.4959 -0.7902** 0.1068 1.0908 -0.5187 -2.0306*** -2.2151*** 0.1008 -0.9158 
  (0.3444) (0.4668) (0.6667) (0.5345) (0.4017) (0.5970) (0.9233) (0.6574) (0.4528) (0.6601) (1.0023) (0.7577) 
Longholder40 0.3766 -0.0972 -0.6168 -0.3722 -0.7586** -1.5444*** -0.0725 -1.0429** -0.376 -1.8161*** -0.4579 -1.5175** 
  (0.3304) (0.4147) (0.4316) (0.4268) (0.3855) (0.5303) (0.5977) (0.5250) (0.4345) (0.5864) (0.6488) (0.6051) 
(Longholder40)*(ctot) -0.0395** -0.0006 0.0373* -0.0002 0.0560*** 0.0973*** 0.0592** 0.0387 0.0145 0.1076*** 0.0828*** 0.0438 
  -0.0162 -0.0207 -0.0207 -0.0220 -0.0189 -0.0264 -0.0286 -0.0271 -0.0213 -0.0292 -0.0311 -0.0312 
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Year Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,521 1,331 1,137 1,421 1,521 1,331 1,137 1,421 1,521 1,331 1,137 1,421 
Adj. R-squared 0.3758 0.264 0.2658 0.3288 0.6078 0.4913 0.468 0.452 0.5588 0.4706 0.4566 0.4393 
 
 
Panel B 
Longholder40 (OLS with Fixed Effect) 
  Physical investment ( ιphy ) Intangible investment ( ιint ) Total investment ( ιtot ) 
VARIABLES 
Least 
Constrained(1) 
2 3 
Most 
Constrained(4) 
Least 
Constrained(1) 
2 3 
Most 
Constrained(4) 
Least 
Constrained(1) 
2 3 
Most 
Constrained(4) 
Standard cash flow 
(c∗) 
0.0001  (0.0047) (0.0012) 0.0008  0.0321*** 0.0292*** 0.0625*** 0.0151** 0.0320*** 0.0249*** 0.0611*** 0.0182** 
  (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0078) (0.0088) 
Standard q (q∗) -0.0749*** -0.0736*** -0.0778* -0.1817*** 0.1358*** 0.1646*** 0.1797*** 0.3816*** 0.0709** 0.0890*** 0.1337** 0.2260*** 
  (0.0200) (0.0226) (0.0422) (0.0531) (0.0251) (0.0272) (0.0521) (0.0587) (0.0322) (0.0338) (0.0642) (0.0817) 
Log Assets 0.0079 0.0125 -0.0537 -0.0488 -0.037 -0.0708** -0.1031** -0.1279*** -0.0373 -0.0628 -0.1585*** -0.2017*** 
  (0.0222) (0.0284) (0.0350) (0.0385) (0.0279) (0.0341) (0.0432) (0.0425) (0.0359) (0.0423) (0.0533) (0.0591) 
Lndelta 0.4497*** 0.3700*** 0.4998*** 0.6172*** -0.2500*** -0.4690*** -0.7952*** -0.7104*** 0.2086* -0.126 -0.3731** -0.102 
  (0.0731) (0.0874) (0.1025) (0.1036) (0.0919) (0.1051) (0.1265) (0.1144) (0.1181) (0.1306) (0.1558) (0.1593) 
Lnvega 
-0.1643*** -0.1906*** 
-
0.2492*** -0.2020*** 0.0262 0.0497 0.1996*** 0.0155 -0.1452*** -0.1391** -0.0467 -0.2190** 
  (0.0339) (0.0445) (0.0554) (0.0604) (0.0426) (0.0535) (0.0684) (0.0667) (0.0547) (0.0664) (0.0842) (0.0929) 
Stock_ownship -0.0338 0.053 0.1066*** -0.0524 0.1218*** 0.1862*** 0.2468*** 0.1634*** 0.0842* 0.2549*** 0.3697*** 0.1321** 
  (0.0316) (0.0392) (0.0352) (0.0366) (0.0397) (0.0472) (0.0434) (0.0405) (0.0510) (0.0586) (0.0535) (0.0563) 
Gvscore -0.4158*** -0.0867 0.0515 -0.1214 -0.2941*** -0.0891 -0.5851*** -0.4129*** -0.7269*** -0.135 -0.4986*** -0.4962*** 
  (0.0891) (0.1012) (0.1131) (0.1196) (0.1120) (0.1216) (0.1396) (0.1320) (0.1439) (0.1511) (0.1720) (0.1839) 
Z-score -1.5128*** -0.473 0.3789 0.9178* 1.0341** 1.3303*** 1.6827** 0.7411 -0.6998 0.918 2.1541** 1.6718** 
  (0.3407) (0.3750) (0.5601) (0.5053) (0.4282) (0.4508) (0.6913) (0.5581) (0.5501) (0.5602) (0.8517) (0.7771) 
Longholder40 0.1432 0.4101 0.3622 0.6438* 0.5397* 0.4521 0.7654* 0.1148 0.6885* 0.8875** 1.2873** 0.8739* 
  (0.2390) (0.2663) (0.3293) (0.3347) (0.3004) (0.3201) (0.4064) (0.3696) (0.3859) (0.3978) (0.5008) (0.5147) 
(Longholder40)*(c∗) -0.0076* -0.0039 -0.0048 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0042 -0.0246*** 0.0123 -0.0121* -0.0079 -0.0299*** 0.0042 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year Fixed effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,510 1,415 1,237 1,423 1,510 1,415 1,237 1,423 1,510 1,415 1,237 1,423 
Adj. R-squared 0.3599 0.2798 0.2431 0.3312 0.4806 0.371 0.3853 0.3758 0.2727 0.1792 0.2505 0.1975 
 
 
34 
 
7. The relationship between CEO overconfidence and financial 
constraints 
We hypothesize that investment-cashflow sensitivity is higher for intangible investments than 
physical investments. Our overconfidence measure is especially applicable to firms that are 
primarily equity-dependent. If a firm is cash-rich or has enough utilized debt limits to finance all 
its desired projects, it should be less sensitive to investment-cashflow. Following Malmendier & 
Tate (2005) and Baker et al. (2003), we construct the K-Z index developed by Kaplan & 
Zingales (1997) for our sample firms. The K-Z index is a logit measure of financial constraint 
that classifies whether a firm is financially constrained or not. Five accounting ratios are used to 
calculate the K-Z index: cashflow to capital, Tobin’s q, leverage, dividend to capital, and cash 
holding to capital. To capture the sensitivity of intangible capital and compare its effect to that of 
the physical capital measure, we construct two different versions of K-Z: 
𝐾𝑍𝑡𝑜𝑡 = −1.001909 ∗ 𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡 + .2826389 ∗ 𝑞𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 3.139193 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒6 − (39.3678 ∗ (𝑑𝑣𝑐 +
𝑑𝑣𝑝)7/𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡) − (1.314759 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑒8/𝐾𝑡𝑜𝑡)      (2) 
 
𝐾𝑍∗ = −1.001909 ∗ 𝐶∗ + .2826389 ∗ 𝑞∗ + 3.139193 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 − (39.3678 ∗ (𝑑𝑣𝑐 +
𝑑𝑣𝑝)/𝐾𝑝ℎ𝑦) − (1.314759 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑒/𝐾𝑝ℎ𝑦)      (3) 
 
Where in 𝐾𝑍𝑡𝑜𝑡 we apply total capital (ktot) and in 𝐾𝑍∗ we apply physical capital (kphy) in the 
denominator. As we mention earlier, total cashflow (𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡), standard cash-flow (𝐶∗), total q (qtot) 
and standard q (q*) are measured following P-T (2017) and defined in the Appendix. A higher 
value of KZ denotes higher financial constraint. We sort the KZ index into quartiles where 
                                                          
6 COMPUSTAT data item: leverage=(item 9+ item 34)/ (item 9+ item 34+ item 216) 
7 COMPUSTAT data item: dvc+dvp= item 21 + item 19 
8 COMPUSTAT data item: Che = item 1 
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Quartile 1 firms are the least constrained and Quartile 4 are the most constrained. We use 
longholder40 as the proxy for overconfidence in this test, as we have shown earlier that this is 
the most moderate of our three measures of overconfidence. Compared to previous studies, our 
results explain investment-cashflow sensitivity in more detail as we consider the impact of 
financial constraints not only on physical investments but also on intangible and total 
investments. Table 5, Panel A presents the regression results measured using total cashflow 
(𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡) and total q (qtot). As predicted, we find that the effects of overconfidence on investment-
cashflow sensitivity are significant for intangible and total investment under the KZ index 
measure. This suggests that the effect of overconfidence on investment-cashflow sensitivity is 
more prominent for intangible investments than physical investments.  
 
As before, we repeat the process of Panel A by replacing total cashflow (ctot) and total q (qtot) 
with standard cashflow (c*) and standard q (q*) in Panel B. As predicted, we find that qtot and ctot 
explain investments better than c* and q*. For example, the coefficient of the interaction term for 
the most constrained case in Table 5, Panel A (intangible investment column) is stronger and 
more highly statistically significant than the same intangible investment column in Table 5, 
Panel B. Further, the Adjusted R2 for the statistically significant coefficients in Panel B are low 
relative to the Adjusted R2 in Panel A. Our findings extend the Malmendier & Tate (2005) 
results that suggest investment-cashflow sensitivity is more pronounced for overconfident CEOs 
operating in a more financial constrained condition. We add that P-T’s measure of cashflow and 
Tobin’s q explain intangible and total investment-cashflow sensitivity more efficiently than the 
literature’s standard cashflow and Tobin’s q measures. 
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Table 6 
Table 6 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression of the column variables on the beginning of the year Tobin’s q, cashflow, firm and CEO characteristic 
variables, longholders, and industry and year fixed effects. Firms are sorted into quartiles based on their intangible intensity measured as 𝐾
𝑖𝑛𝑡
(𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐾𝑝ℎ𝑦)⁄
. Quartile 1 represents the 
least intangible intensity whereas Quartile 4 represents the highest intangible intensity. All the column variables in the table below are scaled by total capital stock (Kphy+Kint). The 
numerator for both total q and standard q is calculated as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus market value of equity [Compustat item prcc_f*csho] minus short-term assets 
[Compustat item act]. The denominators for total q and standard q are total capital stock (Kphy+Kint) and physical capital stock (Kphy), respectively. The numerator for physical 
investment (ιphy) and intangible investment (ιint) are Capital expenditure [Compustat item capx] and R&D [Compustat item xrd] plus 30% of selling, general and administrative 
expenses, respectively. Total investment (itot) is the sum of ιphy and ιint. Longholder40 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever held an option to the final year of 
its duration with the option being at least 40% in the money entering its final year, and otherwise takes the value 0. Longholder100 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
CEO ever held an option to the final year of its duration with the option being more than 100% in the money at least twice during the option holding period, and otherwise takes 
the value 0. Longholderlow is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO exercises stock options that are less than 30% in the money provided the CEO does not hold 
other exercisable options that are more than 30% in the money, and otherwise takes the value 0. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix. The regression results on total 
q (qtot) and total cash flow (ctot) are presented in Panel A while the results of standard q (q*) and standard cashflow (c*) are presented in Panel B. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
P-values are indicated as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  Panel A:  Total q and Cashflow total OLS with Fixed Effect Panel B:  Standard q and Cashflow standard OLS with Fixed Effect 
  Total ( ιtot ) Total ( ιtot ) 
VARIABLES Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Intangible Intensity 19.39% 52.13% 71.52% 86.10% 27.18% 42.74% 74.80% 82.44% 
Cashflow 0.3566*** 0.3677*** 0.3346*** 0.2737*** 0.2093*** 0.0877*** 0.0192*** (0.0037) 
  (0.0615) (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0033) 
Tobinq 0.9139 -0.4721*** 0.3862*** 0.8648*** 0.8143*** 0.1622*** 0.4386*** 0.1789*** 
  (0.8407) (0.1171) (0.1172) (0.1067) (0.1495) (0.0606) (0.0308) (0.0152) 
Log Assets -0.0831** -0.0348 -0.0940*** -0.2048*** -0.0990** -0.0516 -0.1059** -0.1916*** 
  (0.0359) (0.0303) (0.0361) (0.0405) (0.0422) (0.0353) (0.0417) (0.0495) 
Lndelta -0.170 -0.107 -0.8032*** -0.9430*** -0.071 -0.075 -0.7847*** -0.4043*** 
  (0.3141) (0.0910) (0.1061) (0.1252) (0.1249) (0.1050) (0.1241) (0.1512) 
Lnvega -0.2628** -0.0346 -0.0204 0.1856*** -0.2946*** -0.0659 -0.027 0.0158 
  (0.0815) (0.0493) (0.0560) (0.0648) (0.0687) (0.0572) (0.0643) (0.0791) 
Stock_ownship 0.1809 0.2233*** 0.4631*** 0.3094*** 0.1819*** 0.2540*** 0.4858*** 0.2995*** 
  (0.1410) (0.0332) (0.0448) (0.0469) (0.0488) (0.0385) (0.0522) (0.0573) 
Gvscore -0.0957 -0.2701** -0.4315*** -0.7132*** -0.0886 -0.4197*** -0.4823*** -0.7176*** 
  (0.2222) (0.1052) (0.1274) (0.1447) (0.1476) (0.1223) (0.1472) (0.1768) 
Z-score -1.7426** 0.0712 -0.5522 -0.1937 -1.0805*** 1.4334*** 2.4395*** 4.0240*** 
  (0.6588) (0.4687) (0.6413) (0.5432) (0.4068) (0.5420) (0.7396) (0.6665) 
Longholder40 1.529 -2.2668*** -0.9236* -1.4465*** 1.5602*** -0.6567* 0.2116 1.6703*** 
  (0.9586) (0.4430) (0.5098) (0.5417) (0.5148) (0.3960) (0.4652) (0.5137) 
Longholder40*ctot -0.078 0.1110*** 0.0538** 0.0827*** -0.0696** 0.0265** 0.004 -0.0186*** 
  (0.079) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) 
Year Fixed effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Industry Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,828 1,703 1,717 1,649 1,828 1,703 1,717 1,649 
Adj. R-squared 0.3715 0.5263 0.4965 0.4691 0.3251 0.3568 0.3284 0.212 
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8. Comparing subsamples 
In this section, we compare the results of subsamples using the intangible intensity (II) measure. 
In Table 6, we sort the sample firms into quartiles based on their amount of intangible capital.  
𝐼𝐼 = 𝐾
𝑖𝑛𝑡
(𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐾𝑝ℎ𝑦)⁄
 
Quartiles 1 and 2 denote the lowest and highest amounts of II, respectively. The qtot and ctot used 
in this paper fit the data better in settings not only with intangible capital but with physical 
capital as well. The portfolio volatility sensitivity proxy, vega, is higher and more statistically 
significant in the qtot and ctot settings relative to the q* and c* settings. More of the coefficients 
for longholder40 and the interaction term are significant when we use qtot and ctot. We observe 
that q* and c* cannot explain the sensitivity of the longholder40 and the interaction term in a 
high intangible capital environment. Also, the R2 for the statistically significant coefficients are 
higher in the in qtot and ctot settings relative to q* and c*. These results suggest that traditional q* 
and c* are inefficient at measuring investment-cashflow sensitivity. Our results answer the 
question of Chen & Chen (2012), who observe a weaker relationship between the investment-
cashflow sensitivity in recent years. We suggest that this weaker relation is partially caused by 
the increasingly large share of intangible capital at the firm level that cannot be explained 
efficiently by standard q* and c*. P-T argue that intangible capital adjusts more slowly relative 
to physical capital in response to changes in investment opportunities because of adjustment-cost 
convexities, which is a key reason why qtot and ctot explain investment-cashflow sensitivity better 
than q* and c*. 
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Table 7: Errors in variables correction 
Table 7 presents the biased (errors in variables -EIV) corrected results. Base regression, longholder40, longholder100, and longholderlow models using the cumulant estimator 
include three investments dependent variables (ιphy, ιint, ιtot) and firm and year fixed effects. In Panel A, the independent variables are ctot and qtot and the set of control variables 
used in the base regression.  For each of the longholder models, regressions using the cumulant estimator include the base regression variables plus the respective longholder and 
its interaction term with ctot. In Panel B, the process is similar to Panel A, except that we include c* and q* instead of  ctot and qtot. The cumulant estimator for each investment 
dependent variable is measured with and without control variables. The numerator for the both the total q and standard q is calculated as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus 
market value of equity [Compustat item prcc_f*csho] minus short-term assets [Compustat item act]. The denominators for the total q and standard q are total capital stock 
(Kphy+Kint) and physical capital stock (Kphy), respectively. The numerator for physical investment (Iphy) and intangible investment (Iint) are Capital expenditure [Compustat item 
capx] and R&D [Compustat item xrd] plus 30% of selling, general, and administrative expenses, respectively. Total investment (itot) is the sum of Iphy and Iint. R&D [Compustat 
item xrd] includes missing values and is scaled by total capital stock. Capital expenditure [Compustat item capx] is scaled by physical assets (Kphy). ρ2 and τ2 denote the within-firm 
R2 from a hypothetical regression of investment on true variables, and a hypothetical regression of proxy variables on true variables, respectively. We also present the within R2 
obtained from the ordinary least squares regression for comparison. 
    
Specification 
  Panel A: New Measures (ctot and qtot)   Panel B: Standard Measures (c* and q*)   Improvement: A over B 
      𝑅2 𝜌2 𝜏1
2 𝜏2
2 J statistic   𝑅2 𝜌2 𝜏1
2 𝜏2
2 J statistic   𝑅2 𝜌2    
1
. 
B
as
e 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
   
 ιphy  
Fixed Effects   0.04 0.33 0.41 0.87 3.96   0.02 0.02 0.57 0.82 5.61   180% 1490%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.06 0.30 0.60 0.72 10.36   0.06 0.04 0.96 2.41 8.91   16% 586%    
  
ιint 
Fixed Effects   0.29 0.43 0.70 1.36 24.27   0.14 0.16 0.28 0.89 18.29   101% 178%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.32 0.44 0.75 26.38 41.57   0.18 0.20 0.35 0.91 20.56   77% 126%    
  
 ιtot  
Fixed Effects   0.33 0.45 0.78 0.72 30.85   0.06 0.08 0.55 0.84 21.64   440% 495%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.37 0.53 0.69 0.14 43.77   0.11 0.12 0.55 0.87 27.81   251% 354%    
                                         
2
. 
L
o
n
g
h
o
ld
er
4
0
  
 
 ιphy  
Fixed Effects   0.04 0.03 0.69 0.66 5.87   0.02 0.04 0.76 0.69 7.98   80% -24%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.07 0.14 0.79 0.60 7.01   0.06 0.06 0.33 1.01 14.94   10% 145%    
  
ιint 
Fixed Effects   0.30 0.35 0.89 1.37 29.05   0.15 0.17 0.99 0.83 16.08   101% 106%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.33 0.38 0.89 0.43 35.91   0.19 0.21 1.06 0.85 18.09   74% 80%    
  
 ιtot  
Fixed Effects   0.33 0.29 1.14 0.35 31.36   0.07 0.10 0.84 0.75 14.78   375% 182%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.37 0.25 0.54 0.82 36.98   0.11 0.14 0.78 0.81 18.60   227% 78%    
                                         
3
. 
L
o
n
g
h
o
ld
er
1
0
0
 
  
 ιphy  
Fixed Effects   0.05 0.14 0.68 0.64 13.15   0.03 0.03 0.32 0.97 8.55   69% 390%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.07 0.29 0.67 0.68 5.64   0.06 0.04 1.06 3.89 9.28   12% 561%    
  
ιint 
Fixed Effects   0.29 0.37 0.84 0.70 29.21   0.15 0.15 0.41 0.94 17.55   95% 139%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.32 0.40 0.84 1.02 41.97   0.19 0.20 0.58 0.93 19.99   71% 103%    
   ιtot  Fixed Effects   0.33 0.36 0.94 0.39 34.01   0.07 0.09 0.63 0.84 19.83   364% 319%    
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  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.37 0.48 0.79 0.29 47.45   0.11 0.13 0.61 0.88 26.36   227% 284%    
                                         
4
. 
L
o
n
g
h
o
ld
er
_
lo
w
   
 ιphy  
Fixed Effects   0.04 0.18 0.58 0.71 9.07   0.02 0.02 0.57 0.82 5.99   167% 762%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.06 0.29 0.62 0.71 4.24   0.06 0.04 0.94 1.03 8.40   15% 584%    
  
ιint 
Fixed Effects   0.29 0.43 0.68 16.45 19.72   0.14 0.16 0.62 0.86 19.11   101% 164%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.33 0.46 0.72 0.44 32.96   0.18 0.20 0.91 0.87 21.72   77% 124%    
  
 ιtot  
Fixed Effects   0.33 0.46 0.74 1.29 28.88   0.06 0.08 0.62 0.81 22.83   439% 476%    
  Fixed Effects with Controls   0.37 0.49 0.77 0.57 45.02   0.11 0.12 0.63 0.83 28.99   251% 305%    
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9. Errors in variables correction 
In Table 7, we discuss the variation in R2 results between the new and standard measures of 
Tobin’s q and cashflow. We also present evidence that while total q (qtot) is a better proxy to 
measure the true q than standard q (q*) is, the results obtained by using qtot are not error-free. We 
apply the Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014); Erickson & Whited (2012); Erickson & Whited 
(2000); and Erickson & Whited (2002) error in variables cumulant estimator to correct any 
measurement error in our β estimates. The cumulant estimators generate consistent ordinary least 
square estimates by analyzing the higher order cumulants data9.  Errors in the measurement and 
proxy independent variables of OLS provide inconsistent estimators. The cumulant estimator 
overcomes this shortcoming of OLS by generating unbiased estimates of β through the following 
two models: 
𝜄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4) 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(5) 
In equation 4, z represents a vector of perfectly measured control variables. In equation 5, p is a 
noisy proxy of the unobservable true q. The underlying assumptions are 𝑝𝑖𝑡 has non-zero 
skewness, β is not equal to zero, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are independent of each other and independent of 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧𝑖𝑡. In the commonly used finance literature, the standard investment (ι
*) and standard q 
(q*) both suffer from measurement error as they do not include intangible capital stock (Kint) in 
their calculation. The presence of the errors is correlated and violates the cumulant estimator’s 
assumption that 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are uncorrelated
10. To overcome this, we use a new proxy of 𝑞𝑖𝑡with 
                                                          
9 The cumulant estimator is more useful than the Erickson & Whited (2002) higher order moment estimator because 
cumulant estimators are based on polynomial rings. The estimator is based on two step generalized method of 
moments (GMM) and minimum distance approach where the moments are equivalent to higher order cumulants of 
the regression variables. Cumulant estimators are asymptotically similar to higher order moments but have better 
finite sample properties and convenient closed form.   
10 For further details about the cumulant estimator, refer to Erickson et al. (2014). 
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fewer measurement errors. We present the bias-corrected estimation results in Table 7. The base 
regression, longholder40, longholder100, and longholderlow models using the cumulant 
estimator include three investment-related dependent variables (ιphy, ιint, ιtot) and firm and year 
fixed effects. The cumulant estimator for each investment dependent variable is measured with 
and without control variables.  
The following equation describes the base regression model with year and industry fixed effects 
but no controls: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (6) 
Equation 7 is the base regression model with year and industry fixed effects and controls: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽4 + 𝛽5∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑖𝑡 · ∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(7) 
Equation 8 is the Longholders (longholder40, longholder100, longholder-low) regression model 
with year and industry fixed effects but no controls: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑖𝑡 · ∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(8) 
And equation 9 is the Longholders (longholder40, longholder100, longholder-low) regression 
model with year and industry fixed effects but no controls: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽4 + 𝛽5∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑖𝑡 · ∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡(9) 
 
In equations 6-9, 𝐼𝑖𝑡 represents physical, intangible, or total investment respectively. C is the 
cashflow (either standard cashflow [c*] or total cash-flow [ctot]). Q is the Tobin’s q (standard q 
[q*] or total q [qtot]). X is the vector of additional control variables used in the model. ∆ is the 
proxy variables for our CEO overconfidence measures. The vector X includes Z-score, 
governance index, lndelta, lnvega, stock ownership, and the log of total assets. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. In Panel A, the independent variables are ctot and qtot and the set of 
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control variables used in the base regression.  For each of the longholder models, regressions 
using the cumulant estimator include the base regression variables plus the respective longholder 
and its interaction term with ctot. In Panel B, the process is similar to Panel A, except that we 
include c* and q* instead of ctot and qtot. The numerator for the both the total q and standard q is 
calculated as Total debt [Compustat item dltt+dlc] plus market value of equity [Compustat item 
prcc_f*csho] minus short-term assets [Compustat item act]. The denominators for the total q and 
standard q are total capital stock (Kphy+Kint) and physical capital stock (Kphy), respectively. The 
numerator for physical investment (Iphy) and intangible investment (Iint) are Capital expenditure 
[Compustat item capx] and R&D [Compustat item xrd] plus 30% of selling, general, and 
administrative expenses, respectively. Total investment (itot) is the sum of Iphy and Iint. R&D 
[Compustat item xrd] includes missing values and is scaled by total capital stock. Capital 
expenditure [Compustat item capx] is scaled by physical assets (Kphy). Ρ2 and τ2 denote the 
within-firm R2 from a hypothetical regression of investment on true variables, and a hypothetical 
regression of proxy variables on true variables, respectively. We also present the within R2 
obtained from the ordinary least squares regression for comparison. 
 
P-T state that the smaller the cumulant slope, the higher the adjustment costs. The adjustment 
costs are highest among the investment variables of Panel A. These results suggest that the 
adjustment process for intangible investment (R&D) opportunities is slower than for physical 
investment opportunities. The last column of Panel A provides the slope of the cumulant 
estimator Capx/Kphy. This result strongly supports the claim that this slope provides downward 
biased estimates of capital adjustment costs. This happens because the regression of Capx/Kphy 
on the standard q used in the standard literature does not include the ratio of physical capital 
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stock to total capital stock. ρ2 and τ2 are the within-firm R2 from a hypothetical regression of 
investment on true q and a hypothetical regression of a proxy q on true q, respectively. In a 
perfect relation, P-T’s theory predicts that ρ2=1, indicating that the true observed q perfectly 
explains the investments. τ2=1 would indicate that the true q perfectly explains the variation of 
the proxy q.  The cumulant estimation results show that the relation between total investment and 
q becomes stronger (ρ2=.7) when we include intangible capital rather than using the standard 
literature’s physical investment and q (ρ2=.10). This establishes the claim that total q explains 
investments better than standard q. This result holds even when we control the investment and q 
relation with contemporaneous cashflow. We also find that the sensitivity of physical investment 
(.459) to cashflow is much higher when we scale the investment variables by the total capital 
rather than physical capital (.12).  The sensitivity between cashflow and physical investment 
(.459) is slightly lower than the sensitivity between cashflow and intangible investment. 
Consistent with the literature, we find in Panel B that R&D has the lowest sensitivity to 
cashflow. Interpreting the sensitivity between investment and cashflow is a difficult task and the 
existing literature has still not yet reached a consensus about the exact definition of such 
sensitivity (Gourio and Rudanko, 2014; Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen; 1988). It is difficult to 
reach an ironclad conclusion as to the nature and causes of investment-cashflow sensitivity, but 
we can conclude that physical investment is less sensitive to cashflow than standard investment 
but more sensitive than intangible investment. On the other hand, R&D is less sensitive to 
cashflow.  
 
10. Summary and conclusion 
In this study, we extend the corporate investment and CEO overconfidence literature by 
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examining how CEO overconfidence effects investment-cashflow sensitivity through the new 
measures of Tobin’s q and cashflow. Specifically, we incorporate intangible capital, which neo-
classical investment theory mostly ignores in the empirical analysis [P-T, 2017].  Our analysis 
consists of several new tests. First, we develop the corporate investment model following 
Malmendier & Tate (2005) and we then extend the analysis beyond physical capital by 
estimating the regressions using our three measures of investment (iphy, iint, and itot). We then 
measure three versions of overconfidence, namely longholder40, longholder100, and 
longholderlow, using Execucomp data on the personal portfolios of CEOs. In our analysis, we 
use cashflow and Tobin’s q scaled by total and physical capital. In this paper, ctot and qtot denote 
total cashflow and total q, respectively, and are scaled by total capital. C* and q* denote standard 
cashflow and standard q, respectively, and are scaled by physical capital. We regress iphy, iint, itot 
on ctot and qtot as well as on c* and q* separately along with a common set of control variables. In 
addition, we use three overconfidence measures and their interaction with the respective 
cashflow setting to capture all possible effects that may occur due to differing levels of CEO 
overconfidence. Similar to Malmendier & Tate (2005), we find a strong and statistically 
significant relationship between physical investment-cashflow sensitivity and CEO 
overconfidence. Moreover, our results show that the standalone measure of physical capital 
weakly explains intangible investment-cashflow density. Our study offers a valuable insight in 
addressing the concern raised by Chen & Chen (2012) as to why investment-cashflow sensitivity 
has been weaker in recent years. Empirical evidence on this matter is weak because existing 
investment studies mostly ignore intangible capital, which continues to grow and now constitutes 
a significant portion of modern corporate investments. We show that investment-cashflow 
sensitivity is stronger when we incorporate intangible capital into the analysis. The issue of 
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overconfidence matters most for equity-dependent firms. We show that ctot and qtot explain 
overconfidence and investment-cashflow sensitivity better than c* and q* when the firms operate 
with financial constraints. Our study has important implications for a firm’s investment decision 
making process as well as CEO stocks and options practices. Specifically, the standard measure 
of physical capital so prevalent in the literature only weakly explains the intangible capital-
cashflow sensitivity given that the CEO is overconfident. Thus, to measure investment-cashflow 
sensitivity with more precision, firms should incorporate ctot and qtot in their analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Diversity Reputation and Firm Performance 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
America, the renowned “Mother of Exiles”11 who promises “world-wide welcome”12 to all, has 
long symbolized, if not fulfilled, the promise of inclusive diversity. Defining diversity13 as a 
blending of people who have different group identities within the same social system (Fleury, 
1999), it is clear that America is a particularly diverse nation, brimming as it is with people of 
various races, geographic origins, cultural backgrounds, languages, lifestyles, physical 
capabilities, sexual orientations, and a host of other demographic and cultural characteristics 
(Seymen, 2006). America has always had an uneasy relationship with its diversity, but the 
process of reckoning with its past began in earnest with the passage of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act in 1964, which made it illegal to engage in discriminatory employment practices on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. The profusion of laws banning 
discrimination in the 1960s14 reflected a growing cultural consensus of what the people of 
America hoped the country of America would be in the future: an inclusive nation, free from the 
endemic discrimination that had plagued so much of its past.  
 
The intervening decades since the enactment of Title VII have witnessed a steady expansion of 
its mandate to include prohibition of discrimination based on age, pregnancy status, disability, 
sexual orientation15, and gender identity16. Legal decrees certainly expedited the shift from 
segregation to integration, but the general trend towards inclusiveness could not have been 
                                                          
11 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” 1883. 
12 Ibid. 
13 As an aside, Malcolm Forbes, noted entrepreneur and publisher of the finance magazine Forbes, defined diversity as “the art of 
thinking independently together.” 
14 For instance, the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
in 1965, and the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.  
15 There is no law explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but Supreme Court decisions have been 
amenable to a broad interpretation of Title VII to encompass sexual orientation as a protected category (see Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 1989 and Oncale v. Sundowner, 1998). 
16 However, the Department of Justice, under new Attorney General Jeff Sessions, announced in October 2017 that it would 
reverse protection based on gender identity. 
51 
 
achieved without evolving cultural norms. Society at large now considers diversity and inclusion 
to be laudable characteristics worthy of being implemented far and wide. America is becoming 
an increasingly diverse place not just due to the inexorable force of demographic factors, but also 
by design, because Americans prefer things to be that way.  
 
As society becomes more inclusive, as visibility, voice, and power are being granted to a more 
diverse array of people, so too have the corridors of power in workplaces throughout the country 
opened up to a more diverse range of people. Diversity, in addition to being an increasingly 
important cultural issue, is having an increasingly large impact on economic matters.  Numerous 
high-profile boycotts17 of states18 and firms19 that have enacted or supported discriminatory laws 
speak to the prominent role diversity can play in the economy. Indeed, diversity has become “an 
economic issue as well as a legal and social concern” (Cox et al., 1991).  
 
While it is clear that a conspicuous segment of American society values diversity both culturally 
and economically, what does this mean for the financial performance of the individual firm? 
Compelling theoretical arguments can be found both in agreement with and in opposition to the 
premise that diversity is economically beneficial to firms (Li and Nagar, 2013). In the absence of 
a clear theoretical consensus, empirical evidence becomes vitally important. However, obtaining 
unambiguous evidence of the effects of diversity is problematic. Precisely measuring a firm’s 
actual level of diversity is difficult. Furthermore, the effects of diversity are typically not thought 
to have a direct effect on the processes or financial outcomes of a firm (Miller et al., 1998). 
Richard (2000) corroborates that observing a direct, positive relationship between diversity and 
firm performance is not likely. Rather, the effect of diversity on firm performance is mediated by 
other intervening variables, such as reputation, which must be studied in order to get a full 
picture of how diversity impacts firm performance (Miller and Triana, 2009).   
 
                                                          
17 Max Ehrenfreund (March 31, 2015). “Businesses didn’t always boycott discriminatory laws.” The Washington Post. Retrieved 
December 6, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/31/wonkbook-businesses-didnt-always-
boycott-discriminatory-laws/?utm_term=.8008f674d04a. 
18 Ellen McGirt (January 9, 2017). “Boycotts by Businesses Can Still Be Effective.” Fortune. Retrieved December 6, 2017, from 
http://fortune.com/2017/01/09/boycotts-by-businesses/. 
19 Kim Severson (July 25, 2012). “Chick-fil-A Thrust Back into Spotlight on Gay Rights.” The New York Times. Retrieved 
December 6, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/us/gay-rights-uproar-over-chick-fil-a-widens.html. 
52 
 
Signaling theory holds that corporate reputation is valuable in that it reduces stakeholder 
uncertainty. Due to information asymmetries, the public uses both substantive actions and 
symbolic gestures to assess a firm’s quality (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Investors, customers, 
and other stakeholders do not have the time or resources to do this critique themselves, so they 
rely on outside sources (such as the media) to do it for them.  Reputation acts as a convenient 
shortcut.  
 
Because firms compete for reputational status just as they compete for customers, one-upping 
their rivals is a major aspect of a good reputation. In fact, Deephouse and Carter (2005) claim 
that the concept of reputation is meaningless unless placed within the context of relative position: 
“Reputation requires a social comparison across companies in order to determine the relative 
degree of status and prestige that one company possesses.” Corporations’ longing to outshine 
their rivals, coupled with the public’s reliance on outside sources to gauge the quality of 
corporations, has resulted in the current environment where there is an abundance of rankings 
published by various business and finance media20. And since American society is interested in 
diversity and values its presence in the workplace, many of these rankings factor diversity into 
their analysis. According to signaling theory, a firm’s presence on an annual list of Most Diverse 
companies would send a clear message to the public that the firm is serious about diversity and 
has pro-diversity policies in place that are better than the average firm.  
 
There is ample evidence that diversity can improve firm performance. To the extent this is true, 
inclusion on Most Diverse lists would tend to be associated with increased performance. 
However, there is also evidence that diversity actually hinders performance. We posit that the 
actual direct effect of diversity notwithstanding, merely being included on a Most Diverse list, 
that is, a firm merely improving its Diversity Reputation, would tend to have a positive effect on 
firm performance. In this paper, we hypothesize that the concept of diversity is important enough 
to society that the mere appearance of it can serve to enhance a firm’s financial prospects. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that Diversity Reputation positively impacts firm performance. 
 
                                                          
20 For example, a plethora of highly-anticipated year-end lists by the likes of Fortune, Forbes, Entrepreneur, Business Insider, 
Bloomberg, and The Wall Street Journal, to name but a few.   
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Diversity in the workplace is a particularly important issue in America, as it has always been 
home to a stunningly diverse array of people. The modern American workplace is a microcosm 
of modern American society. Diversity is generally considered by the public to be a good thing, 
even though there is no clear-cut empirical consensus on whether its direct impact on firm 
performance is beneficial. When measuring this impact directly proves to be difficult, it is 
advisable to examine the effect of diversity on firm performance as mediated through the impact 
of intervening factors, such as reputation. An easy way to gauge a firm’s reputation for diversity 
is to look at its inclusion in the business media’s annual “Most Diverse” lists. By utilizing 
longitudinal data pulled from such lists, it can be shown that a firm’s Diversity Reputation has a 
positive effect on its firm performance as quantified by a variety of accounting and market 
measures. 
 
The economic value of diversity is unclear. There are theoretical arguments to be made both in 
favor and against it. Diverse firms are more open to new ideas and opportunities (Hong and 
Page, 2004). They also improve the decision-making process by reducing self-deceit and 
overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). On the other hand, diverse firms, with a multitude 
of divergent viewpoints, are more vulnerable to social fracture. Heterogenous organizations are 
less likely to share common norms and culture, which are both very important to building a 
community of mutual support and resolving unforeseen complications (Currani et al., 2009). 
 
Ineffective diversity management can result in firms facing discrimination lawsuits. Employee 
lawsuits can be a signal of flawed HR practices and can cause declines in firm performance 
(Wright and Gardner, 2000). Wooten and James (2004) propose that firms should learn from 
their discrimination crises by addressing the barriers that exist in their firms and moving to 
resolve them by engaging in reflective and reactive learning to prevent discrimination cases in 
the future. This will enable firms to create a workplace environment where employee differences 
are considered an asset. 
 
Roberson and Park (2007) find a positive relationship between diversity reputation and book-to-
market equity with a U-shaped relationship between leader diversity and net income, book-to-
market equity, and revenue. Richard, Murthi, and Ismail (2007) also find a positive, curvilinear, 
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U-shaped relationship between racial diversity and firm productivity in the short-term and racial 
diversity and firm productivity (as measured by Tobin’s Q) in the long-term. However, Julian 
and Ofori-Dankwa (2014) attempt to replicate Richard, Murthi, and Ismail’s results but actually 
find that a commitment to racial diversity actually decreases firm productivity.  Wright, Ferris, 
Hiller, and Kroll (1995) examine the effects of Department of Labor Awards for exemplary 
affirmative action on firm performance and find that such awards serve as a signal that these 
firms have a competitive advantage over firms that experienced announcements of 
discrimination-related announcements. 
Since the theory is divided on the matter, the best way to settle the issue is to conduct an 
empirical study. Previous studies have shown that a commitment to civil rights and diversity lead 
to substantive and permanent improvement in firm value and performance. We seek to gather 
evidence to see if this is indeed the case. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Prior literature on the effects of diversity can be generally grouped into two camps: pro and con. 
In the latter camp, Amason (1996) states that diversity can actually compromise the strategic 
decision-making ability of an organization due to intergroup conflict and a lack of team 
integration and cohesion. Currarini et al. (2009) find that people are hard-wired to practice 
homophily, that is, to have friends who are similar to themselves. They tend to cluster in like-
minded groups that share common norms and culture. These homogenous groups are not without 
their benefit—such environments give rise to communities of mutual support which enable 
conflict resolution. The addition of diverse elements to groups like these would make them 
susceptible to splintering, thus increasing conflict while reducing communication, mutual 
respect, and trust. Jackson et al. (2003) survey several papers that conclude racial and gender 
diversity can reduce communication and social integration in team settings, thus causing conflict.  
 
Phillips and Liljenquist (2009) find that increased diversity does indeed carry with it increased 
discomfort, anxiety, and conflict. Interestingly, however, they find that these perceived negative 
effects are largely illusory and inaccurate. In their experiment, groups consisting of three people 
sharing a group identity (being members of the same fraternity) were given a task to complete in 
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the allotted time. Partway through the allotted time, a fourth member was introduced into the 
group. For some groups, the newcomer was a member of the same fraternity as the original three 
group members, while for other groups, the newcomer belonged to a different fraternity. Groups 
with newcomers from a different fraternity performed better at the task than groups with 
newcomers from the same fraternity, even though they viewed their group interactions as more 
stressful and less effective. This raises the possibility that the negative effects of diversity are 
overstated, and that even surface-level diversity may have a positive impact on team 
performance.  
 
There is an extensive body of literature holding that diversity is in fact beneficial to performance. 
Cox et al.’s (1991) value-in-diversity hypothesis considers diverse groups to enjoy advantages 
over homogenous groups in the areas of knowledge, information, and perspectives. Hong and 
Page (2004) find that diverse organizations are more likely to be innovative and avail themselves 
of new opportunities. Gotsis and Kortezi (2015) realize that a diverse workforce is an 
“uncontested reality” in America. There is no going back to the old days when firms did not have 
to worry about policies involving diversity. Thus, firms would be best served to acknowledge the 
opportunities that diversity grants them to distinguish themselves from their rivals. They should 
treat diversity as a corporate asset to be cultivated. Firms should shift their emphasis from mere 
compliance with nondiscrimination laws to a proactive embrace of policies that promote 
diversity.    
 
Lew Platt, former CEO of Hewlett-Packard, makers of the very computer we are using to type 
this paper right now, acknowledged the effectiveness of diversity, but also saw the necessity of 
providing hard evidence to his stakeholders to “make the business case for diversity” (Kochan et 
al., 2003). For Platt, one value-creating aspect of diversity is that it helps a firm empathize with 
its customer base. He views the ability to “understand and communicate with them in terms that 
reflects their concerns” to be a positive characteristic that can help differentiate a firm from its 
rivals in the market. Richard (2000) agrees that racial diversity can potentially be a way for a 
firm to be able to better understand a culturally diverse customer base. Dezso and Ross (2012) 
also admit the need to make the business case for diversity and use 15 years of panel data on a 
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sample of 1,500 public firms in the U.S. to find that gender diversity in top management results 
in better firm performance.  
 
The existence of these two separate and contradictory bodies of literature regarding the impact 
that diversity has on firm performance points to the difficulty of directly measuring the effects of 
diversity on firm performance. This difficulty is due to intervening factors that mediate the 
relationship between diversity and firm performance (Richard, 2000; Jackson et al., 2003; Miller 
and Triana, 2009). One such factor is reputation. Miller and Triana (2009) define reputation 
simply as “an assessment of a firm’s quality or esteem compared to other organizations.” 
Fombrun (1996) has a more comprehensive idea of reputation, defining it as “a perceptual 
representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall 
appeal to all its key constituents.” When stakeholders are faced with incomplete information 
about a firm, the firm’s reputation acts as a shortcut to help evaluate the merit of the firm and its 
chances of future success or failure. 
 
Reputation is one of the most important intangible resources a firm possesses. A good reputation 
can allow firms to generate superior financial performance (Black et al., 2000; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002).  Prior literature contains much evidence to bear this out. Rindova et al. (2005) 
find that prominence conveys positive information about a firm’s fundamental ability to create 
quality goods or services. They also find that the media is the conduit through which firms 
achieve their increased prominence. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
Diversity Reputation can have a positive effect on firm performance because the media releases 
and distributes the diversity rankings, which in turn increase the included firms’ prominence. 
This amplifies the signal that these firms produce superior goods, which in turn increases their 
customer base. 
 
Some studies have found that inclusion on media outlets’ “Best Of” lists has beneficial impacts 
on financial performance. Filbeck and Preece (2003) find that being awarded a spot on Fortune’s 
“100 Best Companies to Work for in America” list is associated with good relative market and 
financial performance. They conduct an event study around the announcement date of the award 
to determine that the awarded firms enjoyed positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns compared to 
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a matched sample over both one- and multi-year time horizons. Brammer et al. (2009) also 
conduct an event study to find that firms named to Business Ethics’ “Best 100 Corporate 
Citizens” experience small cumulative abnormal returns around a 21-day event window. These 
findings demonstrate that the reputational gains made by firms who are named to the business 
media’s annual best-of lists can result in financial gains.    
 
Certo (2003) finds that board composition sends a signal to the public about the quality of a firm, 
thus shaping the firm’s reputation. A commitment to diversity has been shown to send positive 
signals about firm quality. Fondas (2000) finds that gender and racial diversity can send 
powerful signals to the public. Consistent with Richard (2000), Fondas notes that firms are eager 
to show that they empathize with the public. Thus, they may see the demographic composition of 
their board as an opportunity to mirror the demographics of their stakeholder population, labor 
force, and management. Daily and Dalton (2003) find that board demographic diversity does 
more than send a positive reputational signal—it actually leads to economic benefits. While the 
absence of women and minorities on the board of directors can lead to negative publicity for a 
firm, the presence of women and minorities is positively associated with stock returns.  
 
The prior literature is split as to whether diversity has a beneficial effect on firms’ financial 
performance. A reason for this ambiguity is that diversity itself is difficult to pin down. It does 
not necessarily show its impact on firm performance directly. Rather, the ultimate effect that 
diversity has on firm performance is mediated through intervening factors such as reputation. 
Reputation is a convenient and effective signal because it provides a shortcut by which the public 
can assess complicated issues. That diversity may be a dense, obscure, intractable phenomenon 
does not matter; the public only needs to know that it likes diversity, and that a given firm has a 
reputation for being diverse.  
 
Despite some support for an association between corporate diversity reputation and firm 
performance, little empirical research has investigated this relationship. However, we expect 
diversity reputation to provide stakeholders with information about diversity and diversity 
management practices within firms, and therefore to be related to financial performance. For 
example, a positive diversity reputation may signal that a firm actively recruits women and 
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minorities and focuses on the fair treatment of all employees. Further, diversity reputation may 
signal a firm’s ability to effectively manage diversity among stakeholder groups (e.g., 
consumers, suppliers, etc.). Therefore, stakeholders may be induced to purchase goods and 
services from, and invest in, firms with positive diversity reputations. We hypothesize: 
H1: Diversity reputation is positively correlated with firm performance. 
A firm’s commitment to diversity can be easily gauged by the public by the business media’s 
annual rankings of Most Diverse firms. Inclusion on these lists enhances a firm’s Diversity 
Reputation, which in turn has a beneficial effect on its financial performance.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Following the methodology of Roberson and Park (2006), Richard, Murthi, and Ismail (2007), 
and Julian and Ofori-Dankwa (2014), we use longitudinal data to test the hypothesis that our 
independent variable, Diversity Reputation, has a positive effect on firm performance. We 
measure Diversity Reputation based on a firm’s inclusion on DiversityInc’s list of Top 50 
Companies for Diversity. A firm’s presence on the DiversityInc list not only reflects that its 
corporate practices encourage and embody diversity, it also reflects that they have been rewarded 
and recognized for this by society. The DiversityInc list is based on empirical data gathered 
through firms submitting a survey of over 200 questions in four areas of diversity management: 
talent pipeline, talent development, leadership accountability, and supplier diversity. The stated 
purpose of the survey is to “better assess initiatives to hire, retain, and promote women, 
minorities, people with disabilities, LGBT, and veterans.”21 Unlike other popular surveys such as 
those conducted by Fortune, DiversityInc requires firms to submit detailed information, the 
accuracy of which must be attested to by a high-ranking corporate officer. The DiversityInc 
ranking, while not as well-known as Fortune, is more objective and still highly regarded by the 
media, corporations, government agencies, academics, and the public at large.  
 
                                                          
21 Retrieved December 6, 2017, from http://www.diversityinc.com/diversityinc-top-50-methodology/ 
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In our dataset we code the Diversity Reputation variable based on a firm’s inclusion to the 
DiversityInc list each year. A firm is coded with a “1” for each year it made the list and a “0” for 
each year it did not. Following Julian and Ofori-Dankwa (2014), we then take the square root of 
the sum of the number of years a company is included on the lists. This number becomes our 
Diversity Reputation measure, which is our independent variable of interest and will be described 
in more detail below. Our diversity reputation data covers the years 2010-2015 while our 
Compustat financial performance data covers the years 2011-2015. Following Roberson and 
Park (2006), the reason we lag reputation for one year is to give the reputational effects of 
appearing on the list some time to manifest themselves and to prevent potential issues with 
endogeneity. The total sample includes 78 firms. Of these, 20.25% appeared on the lists only 1 
year, 15.19% appeared 2 years, 12.66% appeared 3 years, 2.53% appeared 4 years, 8.86% 
appeared 5 years, and 39.24% appeared all 6 years.  
 
We then manually match the firms with their gvkey in Compustat, allowing me to pull relevant 
financial data on each firm. All firm performance data is obtained from Compustat. We look at 
the period 2011-2015. Of the 78 firms included in the Diversity Reputation database, 12.8% had 
missing data in Compustat, bringing the total number of firms we examine to 68. 
 
Once we have this sample of firms that have been recognized for their commitment to diversity, 
we then create another group that includes many more companies in our observations so that we 
can compare companies that are not on the DiversityInc lists with those that are on the list. This 
data is also sourced from Compustat, which contains 21,405 potential observations from 2011 to 
2015. Our first group, consisting of firms that have been recognized by DiversityInc, contains 68 
firms that have financial statement, stock price, and share information on Compustat, for a total 
of 322 firm-year observations. Each of these companies also had at least $1,500,000 in revenue 
and total assets. Thus, our second group (the comparison group) includes companies not on the 
DiversityInc lists only if they have at least $1,500,000 in revenue and assets. Further, to allow us 
to compare apples to apples, such companies must operate in a 2-digit SIC code represented by a 
company appearing on a DiversityInc list to be included in the sample. All told, this leaves our 
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second group with 1,055 companies for a total of 4,023 firm-year observations. Table 1 gives an 
overview of our full sample, as well as our two subsamples.  
Table 1: Sample Selection    
     Firm-Year Observations 
Total Compustat firm-year observations, 2011-2015: 21,405 
Total # of firms that appear in industries 
represented on the DiversityInc list, having over $1.5 
million in revenues or total assets, and having 
complete Compustat data: 
4,345 
Total # of firms in Group 1 (appearing on at least one 
DiversityInc list from 2011-2015): 
322 
Total # of firms in Group 2 (not appearing on any 
DiversityInc lists from 2011-2015): 
4,023 
 
For our control variables, we follow closely the methodology of RMI (2007) and Julian and 
Ofori-Dankwa (2014). We use various control variables gathered from Compustat data from 
2011-2015. These include: 
LOGAT = log of average total assets in year t; 
XRDAT = research and development expenditures in year t divided by average total assets 
in year t; 
NIATt = net income divided by average total assets in year t; and 
COGSATt = cost of goods sold in year t divided by average total assets in year t; 
Since we have panel data, we will use a pooled cross-sectional time series regression to test the 
hypothesis that Diversity Reputation is positively related to Firm Performance. Specifically, we 
will use a random-effects GLS estimator in Stata. The following regression models are used to 
examine the impact of noteworthy diversity efforts on companies’ performance and shareholder 
wealth. The regressions take the form: 
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𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑇
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where i= 1…68 are the firms and t is the 5 year period 2011-2015. The regression will be 
run separately for each different measure of Firm Performance, as described below.  
 
The independent variable and control variables are discussed above. Our dependent variable is 
Firm Performance. There are two categories of firm performance we plan on using: accounting 
measures and market measures. The three accounting measures, which are considered in the 
literature to be more relevant as a short-term indicator, that we will use are common ones:  
ROI: return on investment, measured as net income divided by invested capital. This is 
considered to be the most comprehensive measure of firm performance and is also commonly 
used in the prior literature on diversity. 
ROS: return on sales, measured as net income divided by net sales. This is considered to 
be a good measure of competitive advantage between firms. 
ROA: return on assets, measured by the operating income after depreciation divided by 
book value of assets.  
We expect the coefficient on Diversity Reputation for the regressions of each of these 
three accounting measures to be positive.  
 
The market-based performance measure we will use is a variation of Tobin’s Q, defined as 
(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)/ (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙), or (𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒+𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)/ (𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒+𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). Tobin’s Q is 
a common measure of performance that is calculated from data available in Compustat 
(MKTVAL+PSVAL+DEBT)/TA. Where MKTVAL = the number of common shares outstanding 
multiplied by the share price, PSVAL = the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred 
stock, DEBT is (Long-Term Debt) + (Short-Term Liabilities – Short-Term Assets), and TA = the 
book value of the total assets of the firm). We expect Tobin’s Q to have a positive coefficient as 
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well, indicating that firms with higher Diversity Reputation have higher market-to-book ratios, 
suggesting that the market is valuing these firms at a level greater than what their book value 
would warrant. This could indicate that the value of something intangible and off-the-book, such 
as Diversity Reputation, is boosting the market value of these firms above the value of their 
recorded assets.  
 
4. Findings 
 
Table 2 presents the univariate analysis on diversity reputation. As Table 2 shows, the 
descriptive statistics for Group 1 (our DiversityInc sample) and Group 2 (our sample of firms not 
listed in DiversityInc) are different in interesting ways. Further, an examination of the results of 
t-tests for differences between means of the groups reveals that these differences are statistically 
significant. The firms in Group 1 (that is, the firms recognized by DiversityInc) had significantly 
higher logged total assets and net income. However, research and development expenses did not 
show a significant difference, perhaps because so few firms in either group reported R&D 
expenses at all. More importantly, as reflected below in Table 2, the means of all our measures of 
firm performance are significantly higher for firms within our DiversityInc group. The increased 
Tobin’s Q for the DiversityInc group may signify that firms that make a concerted commitment 
to diversity see a corresponding increase in shareholder value.  
Table 2: Univariate Analysis on Diversity Reputation  
Panel A: Diversity Reputation and Firm Performance  
Dependent Variable N Top 50 N Not Top 50  Difference [1]-[2] T-statistic   
Return on Assets 322 0.07 4023 0.05 0.03 3.66 *** 
Return on 
Investment 
322 0.14 4023 0.12 0.02 2.34 
** 
Tobin's Q 322 2.19 4023 1.71 0.48 4.46 *** 
Return on Sales 322 0.12 4023 0.10 0.03 2.17 ** 
Table 2 reflects the univariate analysis of the impact of Diversity Reputation on Firm Performance. We 
measure firm performance using Return on Assets, Return on Investment, Tobin's Q, and Return on Sales. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 presents the results from our regression analyses for the full sample with return on 
assets, return on investment, return on sales, and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variables. Our 
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independent variable of interest here is Diversity Reputation, described in detail above. Panel A 
presents results for the models without fiscal year or 2-digit SIC industry codes as control 
variables while Panel B includes results for models including 2-digit SIC industry codes and 
dummy variables for year as control variables. The results in Table 3, Panel A show that the 
coefficient on Diversity Reputation for all our measures of firm performance is positive. It is 
statistically significant for Tobin’s Q, return on assets, and return on investments. More 
importantly, it is highly significant (p-value <0.001) for Tobin’s Q and return on assets. This 
corroborates our intuition above, namely that firms that have a high level of diversity also enjoy 
increased performance in both the short- and long-term, especially in the areas of operating 
efficiency and firm value.  
  
Table 3: Parameter Estimates and Significance from Regression Results  
Panel A: Regression Results with Full Sample, no additional controls   
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q   ROA   ROI   ROS   
          
Diversity Reputation 0.09 *** 0.11 *** 0.02 ** 0.01  
  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.034)  (0.309)  
LOGAT  -0.1 *** -0.08 *** 0.02 *** -0.14  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.157)  
XRDAT  6.31 *** 0.35 ** 0.47 ** 0.61 ** 
  (0.007)  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.047)  
NIAT  6.54 ***       
  (0.006)        
COGSAT  -0.08 *       
  (0.071)        
n= 4,325          
R square  0.27  0.2  0.17  0.08  
          
Table 3, Panel A reflects the results of the regression results with no additional controls. P-values 
are listed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3, Panel B contains additional controls of dummy variables for years as well as industry 
codes. The results are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different from the results in Table 
64 
 
3, Panel A. The coefficient on Diversity Reputation across all four of our productivity measures 
are positive, although of smaller magnitude across the board. Again, these results are highly 
statistically significant for Tobin’s Q and return on assets.  
          
Table 3: Parameter Estimates and Significance from Regression Results  
Panel B: Regression Results with Full Sample, with additional fiscal year and industry controls 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q   ROA   ROI   ROS   
          
Diversity Reputation 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.07 ** 0.01  
  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.529)  
LOGAT  -0.07 *** -0.07 *** 0.03 ** -0.11 * 
  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.029)  (0.084)  
XRDAT  6.01 *** -0.24 * -0.07 ** 0.42  
  (0.001)  (0.057)  (0.022)  (0.545)  
NIAT  6.18 ***       
  (0.001)        
COGSAT  -0.12 ***       
  (0.001)        
n= 
4,325          
R 
square  0.37  0.31  0.24  0.2  
          
Table 3, Panel B reflects the results of the regression results with the additional controls of fiscal 
year as well as 2-digit SIC code. P-values are listed in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Increased legal protection and the evolution of cultural norms have fostered the development of a 
society that welcomes diversity and values its presence in the workplace. Though theoretical and 
empirical evidence of the economic benefits of diversity is mixed, society at large still deems 
increased diversity to be a commendable goal. The high regard with which society views 
diversity is evidenced in the popularity and pervasiveness of diversity rankings. Inclusion on 
these lists sends a signal to the public that a firm is committed to cultivating diversity in the 
workplace. Regardless of the direct effect of diversity on firm performance, the firm’s enhanced 
Diversity Reputation, as measured by inclusion on DiversityInc’s list of Top 50 Companies for 
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Diversity in the years 2010-2015, leads to a positive effect on Firm Performance, as measured 
by various accounting measures (ROI, ROS, ROA) and the market measure of Tobin’s Q. Our 
results, while they in no way settle the debate, do provide some evidence bolstering the claim 
that diversity is beneficial to firm performance. The highly statistically significant finding 
regarding Tobin’s Q merits particular mention. As we expected, Tobin’s Q has a positive 
coefficient in our regressions, indicating that firms with higher Diversity Reputation have higher 
market-to-book ratios, suggesting that the market is valuing these firms at a level greater than 
what their book value would warrant. This could indicate that the value of something intangible 
and off-the-book, such as Diversity Reputation, is boosting the market value of these firms above 
the value of their recorded assets.  
 
Further research could be conducted to disentangle the beneficial effects of diversity reputation 
from the beneficial effects of diversity itself. That is, if there are two similar firms, both of which 
have a similar commitment to diversity that is reflected in their corporate practices, with the 
main difference being that one has been recognized for its commitment to diversity (say, through 
inclusion on a Most Diverse list such as the one published by DiversityInc) while the other has 
not, then the firm that has been recognized for its efforts to promote diversity should have better 
firm performance that the similarly diverse one that has not been recognized. One way to 
approach this question is by identifying which companies narrowly missed the cutoff mark for 
being recognized by Fortune or DiversityInc. Unfortunately, that information was unavailable at 
this time, but answering this question offers a potentially fruitful area for future research.   
66 
 
References 
Amason, A. C. (1996). ‘Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict on 
strategic decision making’. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 123–48. 
Black, E., Carnes, T., and Richardson, V. (2000). ‘The market value of corporate reputation’. 
Corporate Reputation Review, 1, 31–42. 
Brammer, S., Brooks, C., and Pavelin, S. (2009). The stock performance of America’s 100 Best 
Corporate Citizens. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 1065-1080. 
Certo, S. T. (2003). ‘Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: signaling with 
board structures’. Academy of Management Review, 28, 432–46. 
Cox, T. H., Lobel, S. A., and McLeod, P. L. (1991). ‘Effects of ethnic group cultural differences 
on cooperative and competitive behavior on a group task’. Academy of Management Journal, 34, 
827–47. 
Currarini S., Jackson M., and Pin P. (2009). An economic model of friendship: Homophily, 
minorities, and segregation. Econometrica, 77:1003–1045.  
Daily, C. M. and Dalton, D. R. (2003). ‘Women in the boardroom: a business imperative’. 
Journal of Business Strategy, 24, 8–9. 
Deephouse, D. L. and Carter, S. M. (2005). ‘An examination of differences between 
organizational legitimacy and organizational reputation’. Journal of Management Studies, 42, 
329–60. 
Dezso, C.L. and Ross, D.G. (2012). Does female representation in top management improve firm 
performance? A panel data investigation. Strategic Management Journal, 33:9, 1072-1089. 
Filbeck, G., & Preece, D. (2003). Fortune’s 100 best companies to work for in America: Do they 
work for shareholders? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30, 771-797. 
Fleury, M.T.L. (1999), ‘‘The management of culture diversity: lessons from Brazilian 
companies’’, Industrial Management & Data Systems, 99:3, 109-14. 
Fombrun, C. (1996). Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Fombrun, C. and Shanley, M. (1990). ‘What’s in a name? Reputation building and corporate 
strategy’. Academy of Management Journal, 33, 233–58. 
Fondas, N. (2000). ‘Women on boards of directors: gender bias or power threat?’. In Burke, R. J. 
and Mattis, M. C. (Eds), Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International Challenges 
and Opportunities. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 171–8. 
Edelman, L. B., Erlanger, H. S., & Lande, J. (1993). Internal dispute resolution: The 
transformation of civil rights in the workplace. Law and Society Review, 497-534. 
67 
 
Goldman, B. M. (2001). Toward an understanding of employment discrimination claiming: An 
integration of organizational justice and social information processing theories. Personnel 
Psychology, 54(2), 361-386. 
Gotsis, G. and Kortezi, Z. (2015). Critical Studies in Diversity Management Literature: A 
Review and Synthesis. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.  
Hersch, J. (1991). Equal employment opportunity law and firm profitability. Journal of Human 
Resources, 139-153. 
Hong, L. and Page, S. (2004). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-
ability problem solvers. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 101:16385–16389. 
Jackson, S. E., Joshi, A., and Erhardt, N. L. (2003). ‘Recent research on team and organizational 
diversity: SWOT analysis and implications’. Journal of Management, 29, 801–30.  
James, E. H., & Wooten, L. P. (2006). Diversity crises: How firms manage discrimination 
lawsuits. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1103-1118. 
Julian SD, Ofori-Dankwa J. 2017. Context Matters: Diversity’s short- and long-term effects in 
Fortune’s best companies to work for. Strategic Management Journal. 38: 1557 – 1565. 
Kochan, T., Bezrukova, K., Ely, R. J., Jackson, S., Joshi, A., Jehn, K., Leonard, J., Levine, D. 
and Thomas, D. (2003). ‘The effects of diversity on business performance: report of the diversity 
research network’. Human Resource Management, 42, 3–21. 
Li, F. and Nagar, V. (2013). Diversity and Performance. Management Science, 59:3, 529-544. 
Miller, C. C., Burke, L. M., and Glick, W. H. (1998). ‘Cognitive diversity among upper-echelon 
executives: implications for strategic decision processes’. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 
39–58. 
Miller, T. and Triana, M.D.C. (2009). Demographic diversity in the boardroom: mediators of the 
board diversity-firm performance relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 46:5, 755-786.  
Mitchell, M. L., & Stafford, E. (2000). Managerial decisions and long‐term stock price 
performance. The Journal of Business, 73(3), 287-329. 
Phillips K.W., Liljenquist K.A., and Neale M.A. (2009). Is the Pain Worth the Gain? The 
Advantages and Liabilities of Agreeing with Socially Distinct Newcomers. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(3): 336-350.  
Richard, OC. (2000). ‘Racial diversity, business strategy, and firm performance’. Academy of 
Management Journal, 43, 164–77. 
Richard OC, Murthi BPS, Ismail K. 2007. The impact of racial diversity on intermediate and 
long-term performance: the moderating role of environmental context. Strategic Management 
Journal 28: 1213-1233. 
68 
 
Rindova, V. P., Williamson, I. O., Petkova, A. P., & Sever, J. M. (2005). Being good or being 
known: An empirical examination of the dimensions, antecedents, and consequences of 
organizational reputation. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 1033-1049.  
Roberson, Q. M., & Park, H. J. (2007). Examining the link between diversity and firm 
performance: The effects of diversity reputation and leader racial diversity. Group & 
Organization Management, 32(5), 548-568. 
Roberts, P. W. and Dowling, G. R. (2002). ‘Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial 
performance’. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 1077–93. 
Seymen, O. A. (2006). The cultural diversity phenomenon in organizations and different 
approaches for effective diversity management: A literary review. Cross-Cultural Management. 
An International Journal, 13(4), 296–315. 
Wooten, L. P., & James, E. H. (2004). When firms fail to learn: The perpetuation of 
discrimination in the workplace. Journal of Management Inquiry, 13(1), 23-33. 
Wright, P. M., & Gardner, T. M. (2000). Theoretical and empirical challenges in studying: the 
HR practice-firm performance relationship. 
Wright, P., Ferris, S. P., Hiller, J. S., & Kroll, M. (1995). Competitiveness through management 
of diversity: Effects on stock price valuation. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 272-287. 
  
69 
 
Appendix 
 
Variable Definitions 
LogAsset (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2005) 
Natural log of the book value of total assets (Total Assets 
[#6]) 
Mkt to Book (Biddle, et al., 2009) The ratio of the Market value of total assets (Total Assets 
[#6]+(Common Shares Outstanding [#25] *Share 
Price[#199])- Total Common Equity [#60]- Deferred 
Taxes (Balance Sheet) [#74]) to the Book value of total 
asset[#6] 
 
Z-Score (Brockman, et al., 
2010) 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Altman’s 
Z-score is greater than 1.81, otherwise zero. The Z-score 
is calculated as 3.3*Operating Income After Depreciation 
[#178]/Total Assets[#6]+1.2*(Total Current Assets [#4]- 
Total Current Liabilities [#5])/ Total Assets 
[#6]+Sales[#12]/ Total Assets [#6]+.6*Share 
Price[#199]* Common Shares Outstanding [#25]/(Total 
Long-Term Debt [#9]+ Debt in Current Liabilities 
[#34])+1.4* Retained Earnings [#36]/Total Assets[#6] 
Longholder40 (Huang, et al., 2016) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever 
held an option to the final year of its duration and the 
option is at least 40% in the money entering its final year, 
otherwise 0. 
Longholder100 (Campbell, et al., 
2011) 
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO ever 
held an option to the final year of its duration and the 
option is more than 100% in the money at least twice 
during the option holding period, otherwise 0. 
Longholder-
low 
(Campbell, et al., 
2011), 
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO 
exercises stock options that are less than 30% in the 
money and the CEO does not hold other exercisable 
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options that are more than 30% in the money, otherwise 
0. 
Ln(1+Delta) (Brockman, et al., 
2010), (Core & 
Guay, 2002), (Guay, 
1999) 
This variable is proxied by the natural logarithm of 
(1+Delta). Delta is a proxy of CEO’s portfolio price 
sensitivity. Delta indicates the change in the CEO’s 
stocks and options prices due to a 1% increase in the 
firm’s common share price.  
Option 
Ownership 
(Datta, et al., 2005) This variable is measured as the number of exercisable 
options owned by the CEO divided by the common 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year 
Stock 
Ownership 
(Datta, et al., 2005) This variable is measured as the number of shares owned 
by the CEO, excluding options, divided by the common 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year 
Ln(1+Vega) (Brockman, et al., 
2010), (Core & 
Guay, 2002), (Guay, 
1999) 
This variable is proxied by natural logarithm of 
(1+Vega). Vega is a proxy of CEO’s portfolio volatility 
sensitivity. Vega indicates the change in the CEO’s 
stocks and options prices due to a 1% increase in the 
firm’s annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
return  
G-Score (Cory A., et al., 
2012) 
G-score is a proxy for corporate governance. G-score is 
consisting of six variables calculated as follows; 
G − score
= ∑(BoardInd, CeoChair, Attendance75, FinExpert,
CgDiligence, NotClassified ) 
BoardInd= A proxy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the percentage of independent directors is greater than 
the median percentage of independent directors of the 
sample firms, otherwise 0. 
CeoChair= A proxy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the CEO is not the chair of the Board, otherwise 0 
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Attendance75= A proxy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the Board members attend at least 75% of the 
meetings, otherwise 0. 
FinExpert= A proxy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
at least one of the Board members attending is a financial 
expert, otherwise 0. 
CgDiligence= A proxy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the percentage of corporate governance committee 
members is greater than the median percentage of 
corporate governance committee members of the sample 
firms, otherwise 0. 
NotClassified= A proxy variable that takes the value of 1 
if the Board is not classified, otherwise 0. 
Total q (Peters & Taylor, 
2017) 
Guided by the theory of P-T, we measure firms’ total q 
(qit
tot), which takes intangible capital into consideration. 
qit
tot=
Vit
K
it
phy
+Kit
int
 . Where V =
Market value of common stock [prccf ∗ csho] +
Book value of debt[ dlc + dltt] −
Firm′s current assets[act] . 
 
Standard q (Erickson & 
Whited, 2012) 
We measure traditional Tobin’s q, which we call 
standard q in this paper, as qit
∗ =
Vit
K
it
phy. This measure of 
standard q takes the property, plant, and equipment 
(ppegt) [#7] in the denominator and is widely used in the 
investment q literature 
Physical 
Investment 
(Peters & Taylor, 
2017) 
ιit
phy
=
Iit
phy
Ki,t−1
tot . Iit
phy
= Capx[#13],  Ktot = Kphy + Kint 
 
Intangible 
Investment 
(Peters & Taylor, 
2017) 
ιit
int =
Iit
int
Ki,t−1
tot  where Iit
int = R&D[#18] + .3 × SG&A[#189] 
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Total 
Investment 
(Peters & Taylor, 
2017) 
ιit
𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ιit
int + ιit
𝑝ℎ𝑦
 
Intangible 
intensity 
(Peters & Taylor, 
2017) 
𝐼𝐼 = 𝐾
𝑖𝑛𝑡
(𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐾𝑝ℎ𝑦)⁄
 
Standard 
Cashflow 
(Peters & Taylor, 
2017), (Erickson 
and Whited, 2012), 
(Almeida & 
Campello, 2007) 
Cit
∗ =
IBit+DPit
K
i,t−1
phy . Income Before Extraordinary Items 
[#237]+ Depreciation and Amortization[#5] 
 
Total 
Cashflow 
(Peters & Taylor, 
2017) 
Cit
tot =
IBit+DPit+Iit
int(1−k)
Ki,t−1
tot . Where K is the marginal tax 
rate assumed to be 30%. It is notable that the numerator 
of the equation treats R&D and SG&A as the operating 
expenses. To consider the profits available to total 
investment (𝜄𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡) we add back the tax adjusted intangible 
investment [𝜄𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡] to the numerator of the Standard 
Cashflow equation  and scale by the total capital stock 
(Lev & Sougiannis, 1996). We consider a marginal tax 
rate of 30% (P-T). 
 
  
73 
 
Vita 
 
The author was born in Champaign, Illinois. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in 
Economics and Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2003 and his Master of 
Science degree in Financial Economics from the University of New Orleans in 2017. He is 
pursuing a Ph.D. in Financial Economics at the University of New Orleans.  
 
